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Whatever evils today's opinion [affirming the conviction] may
redress, in my view, pale beside those it will engender. Courts must
resist the temptation [to stretch criminal statutes] in the interest of
the long-range preservation of limited and even-handed
government. All Americans... are entitled to protection from
prosecutorial abuse. The facts of this case suggest a depressing
erosion of that protection ....
Our criminal-justice system runs on the premise that prosecutors
will respect and courts will enforce the boundaries on criminal
conduct set by the legislature. Where, as here, those boundaries
are breached, it becomes impossible to tell where prosecutorial
discretion ends and prosecutorial abuse, or even discrimination,
begins.
In this excerpt from a recent United States Supreme Court case,
the dissent sharply denounces the majority's decision to affirm a
criminal conviction. The essence of the dissenters' complaint is that
the Court has inappropriately-indeed, recklessly-expanded the
government's powers at the expense of individual rights. Given the
general rightward shift in the Court's jurisprudence in criminal cases
over the last twenty-five years, such criticisms are common in
dissenting opinions.' Not surprisingly, these dissents have usually
been written by justices perceived to be "liberal," 2 most notably by
former Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, and,
somewhat less consistently, by Justice John Paul Stevens and, late in
his tenure, former Justice Harry Blackmun.3
There is little doubt, in fact, that if the dissenting opinion quoted
above had involved narcotics or violent crime-categories that
1. See infra Part II.
2. I use the terms "liberal" and "conservative," along with the terms "left" and
"right," as shorthand to describe the judicial philosophies of certain United States
Supreme Court justices in criminal cases. I do so because these are the terms used most
frequently in common parlance. See, eg., Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Blackmun and
Criminal Justice: A Modest Overview, 28 AKRON L. REv. 125, 125-26 (1995)
(characterizing the ideological positions of the justices in criminal cases). These terms
necessarily oversimplify both the individual justices' philosophies in criminal cases, and
the nature of their judicial philosophies in general. But perceptions of "left" and "right"
in criminal cases, imprecise though they may be, are more often accurate than not, and are
therefore useful in framing the issues in this paper. See infra note 7.
3. Justice Blackmun's general leftward shift did not include criminal cases until near
the end of his tenure in 1994; by 1990, he was part of a liberal criminal case bloc that also
included Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. See Wasby, supra note 2, at 126 ("in
roughly the last decade of his service on the Court, [Justice Blackmun] moved away
from... conservatives.., to change his tone-he was called a 'voice of reason' in criminal
matters-and to vote more frequently with Justices Brennan and Marshall...").
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consume the vast majority of the Court's docket in criminal
matters4-it would likely have been authored by one of the Court's
liberal members. The case from which the quotation is taken,
however, involved a white collar crime;5 the dissent was written by
Justice Clarence Thomas, who was joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, together perceived to be the
Court's three most conservative members.6
Justice Thomas' pro-defense posture is no aberration in the white
collar crime context-a conclusion that will not surprise anyone who
has taught, as I have, courses in both federal criminal procedure and
white collar crime, or to anyone else who has carefully studied the
Court's decisions in the white collar area.7  Simply put, in a
substantial number of the Court's leading white collar criminal cases,
ranging from securities fraud to political corruption cases, the
"liberal" justices have voted to affirm convictions, and the
"conservative" justices to reverse them.8 Even more frequently, these
cases have produced strange alliances among the liberals and
conservatives, who rarely split into such groupings in non-white collar
criminal cases.9 And it is not merely votes and alliances that change
in white collar cases; judicial philosophies, attitudes, and rhetoric
transmogrify into a veritable twilight zone of Supreme Court criminal
law jurisprudence.
The justices' voting in the white collar criminal cases thus often
appears to be philosophically at odds with their overall criminal
4. See Appendix, Table 1.
5. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), discussed infra at notes 213-21. The
term "white collar crime" was originally coined by criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland in
1939 during his presidential address to the American Sociological Society in Philadelphia.
Edwin Sutherland, The White Collar Criminal, 5 AM. Soc. REv. 1 (1940).
6. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,289 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. Justice Thomas has consistently been labeled as one of the Court's most
conservative members. See Christopher E. Smith, The Impact of New Justices: The U.S.
Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Policy, 30 AKRON L. REV. 55, 60 (1996) ("Thomas
immediately became a consistent member of the Court's most conservative voting bloc in
his initial terms on the Court"). For a recent example of Justice Thomas' "liberal"
approach in a case with a white collar defendant, see United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct.
2028 (1998), in which Justice Thomas' majority opinion-striking down a forfeiture as an
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment-was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. One commentator noted that Justice Thomas had never before
joined this group in a five-to-four decision. Linda Greenhouse, "Justices Narrow the Uses
of Forfeiture," N. Y. TIMES, June 23,1998, at A14, Col. 1.
8. See infra Part III.A. For example, one commentator noted that, in five-to-four
cases, Justice Marshall was consistently pro-defendant, except in white collar cases.
Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme
Court, 1900-90,21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 693 (1993).
9. For an overview of the literature on coalition-building variables in Supreme Court
cases, see id. at 693 n. 79.
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justice philosophies, a conclusion I refer to as the "white collar
paradox."1 0  The common explanation for this paradox goes
something like this: "Well, of course. The conservatives can relate to
the white collar defendants, and are thus inclined to view the
prosecution of such defendants with hostility. The liberals' instinct is
just the opposite-to punish those who have abused their positions of
wealth and prestige."'" One prominent study of sentences imposed in
white collar cases before the new federal sentencing guidelines in fact
supports this conventional wisdom.12 Apart from the sentencing
context, however, no one seems to have studied carefully the
apparent paradox that pervades the Court's white collar crime
jurisprudence. 13
The common or "traditional" view of the Court's white collar
jurisprudence-that it is essentially class-based and result-driven-is a
cynical one. It postulates that the members of the Court alter their
views on criminal justice matters according to subjective reactions to
the defendants' social status. From this perspective, legal analysis in
white collar cases-which often involves complex issues of statutory
interpretation' 4-simply cloaks decisions rooted in personal bias.
These cases' discussions of legislative history, statutory language, and
common law can be seen as fundamentally hypocritical efforts to
justify decisions that are in reality rooted in the individual justices'
visceral reactions to the cases' socio-economic contexts.1
5
This "traditional" perspective, if accurate, is disturbing. It
bespeaks both deep-seated hypocrisy and intellectual shallowness on
the Court. It is my view that the explanation is, not surprisingly, far
more complex than the common wisdom would allow. First, when
analyzing the types of issues white collar cases raise, we see that
concerns over statutory construction and federalism may skew the
justices' usual criminal case ideologies. Second, and more
10. "Paradox" is defined, inter alia, as "something (as a person, condition, or act) with
seemingly contradictory qualities .... " WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 830
(1977).
11. For an overview of authorities who subscribe to this view, see infra Section IV.A.
12. See WHEELER, MANN, AND SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING
OF WHITE- COLLAR CRIMiNALS 107,161 (1988).
13. See Martin F. Murphy, No Room at the Inn? Punishing White-Collar Criminal, 40
JUN B.BJ. 4 (1996) (examining the sentencing practices of judges and "[t]he historic
lenient treatment of white-collar criminals").
14. See infra at Part IV.
15. See Wheeler, supra note 12, at 160-61 ("There is the possibility that [judges] will
treat white-collar offenders differently because they can empathize with their plight.
Being able more easily to identify with them, they may be prone to leniency.... Part of
the difficulty and the difference of sentencing white-collar offenders is that judges
recognize that the life of the offender is not terribly different from that of the judge or
people the judge knows.").
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fundamentally, white collar criminal statutes often raise unique
concerns over the nature of criminalization and punishment. It may
be that the nature of white collar criminalization, and its current
flaws, have more than any other factors contributed to the white
collar paradox.
A comprehensive analysis of the Court's white collar crime
jurisprudence is a daunting undertaking, but is also a necessary one
given the pervasively cynical view of the American criminal justice
system. This article takes a first step at understanding that
jurisprudence. As an initial matter, even framing the question is
problematic; defining "white collar crime," and determining the sets
of white collar and non-white collar cases to compare, are preliminary
and complex tasks. Once the parameters have been established, I
examine some representative cases, pointing out the differences in
philosophies and rhetoric in the two groups of cases. I conclude that
the explanation for the apparent hypocrisy in the white collar cases is
far more complex than most analysts have acknowledged. Finally, I
offer a suggestion for an approach to white collar jurisprudence that
addresses more directly than the Court's current approach the
struggle to accommodate a category of crimes that does not neatly fit
into generally held views of criminal "justice."
I. Defining the Inquiry
In comparing two universes of cases, the obvious preliminary
tasks are both to delineate the distinction between them and to
ensure its validity. As to the former, commentators over the last
twenty years have complicated the issue by proposing that the
traditional, status-based definition of white collar crime be replaced
with myriad other definitions.16 After reviewing the various proposed
definitions, I suggest a pragmatic distinction between white collar and
non-white collar crime based upon the types of cases lawyers and
judges appear to treat as "white collar." Having drawn the sets of
cases, I then examine two disparities that appear to exist. First,
"substantive" criminal law issues are more common in the Court's
white collar cases, while "procedural" issues predominate in the
Court's non-white collar criminal cases. A look at the cases reveals,
however, that the substance/procedure distinction is a somewhat
artificial one, and that the two sets of cases (white collar and non-
white collar) can be compared in their entireties. (Whether the
outcomes in cases may be more driven by a substance/procedure
16. See DAVID WEISBURD, STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING, & NANCY BODE,
CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 3-9 (1991), for a discussion of how the definition of "white collar crime" has
evolved.
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distinction than by a white collar/non-white collar distinction is an
issue I address in Part IV.) Second, some cases commonly considered
to be "white collar" crime cases in fact are cases brought by the
government to obtain civil remedies. 17 Because the outcomes in these
cases will directly or indirectly affect future criminal proceedings
under the same or related statutory schemes, they are fairly included
in the "white collar" sample.
A. Setting the Parameters of "White Collar Crime"
Coined by criminologist and sociologist Edwin Sutherland in
1939, the term "white collar crime" has been in use for 60 years.18 It
is only since the mid-1970s, however, that "white collar crime" has
gained the focus of prosecutors, courts, and commentators. 19 Since
that time, theorists and practitioners have come to employ the term in
widely divergent ways.20 For purposes of this paper, we must
17. See, e.g., Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Commentators have noted that white collar "crime" often blurs the distinction between
civil and criminal liability. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Criminal Tax Fraud: The Downfall
of Murderers, Madams and Thieves, 29 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 639 (1997); Pamela H. Bucy, The
Poor Fit of Traditional Evidence Doctrine and Sophisticated Crime: An Empirical Analysis
of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 (1994); John C. Coffee,
Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193,220 (1991).
18. Sutherland used the term during a 1939 address, entitled "The White-Collar
Criminal," presented to a joint meeting of the American Sociological Society and the
American Economic Association. See Sutherland, supra note 5.
19. See Norman Abrams, Assessing the Federal Government's "War" on White-Collar
Crime, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 984, 984 (1980) (noting the new "war" on white collar crime);
William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 787 (1988) ("In the mid-
1970s federal prosecutors became increasingly interested in white collar offenses...");
Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime:
How Far Will The Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 405, 408 (1993)
("Beginning in the mid-1970s... the federal government began targeting white collar
crime as a high-priority prosecutorial area."); Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate And White
Collar Crime: Simplifying The Ambiguous, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 391, 392 (1994) (it is
"evident that the federal government has made white collar crime a priority...").
20. Compare, e.g., EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT
VERSION 7 (1983) (white collar crime is that "committed by a person of respectability and
high social status in the course of his occupation"), with Podgor, supra note 19, at 393-94
(a definition of white collar crime should "look[ I to the activity involved and classiffy]
that activity based upon its attributes as opposed to the socio-economic status of the
individuals who engage in the act"), and BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA
TERMINOLOGY 215 (1981) (focusing on both criminal means and socio- economic status
of the defendant). See generally, David T. Johnson & Richard A. Leo, The Yale White-
Collar Crime Project A Review and Critique, LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 63-66 (1993);
Stanton Wheeler, White Collar Crime: History of an ldea, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 1652-56 (S. Kadish ed. 1983); JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ELLEN D. PODGOR, &
PAUL D. BORMAN, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 1-12 (1996).
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distinguish white collar crime from all other types of crime for the




The impetus for Sutherland's study of white collar crime was his
thesis that, contrary to popular belief, crime is neither primarily
caused by social determinants nor primarily perpetrated by those of
low socio-economic status.22 In his oft-quoted description, Sutherland
wrote that "[w]hite collar crime may be defined approximately as a
crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in
the course of his occupation."23 In his studies, Sutherland focused on
crimes committed by organizations acting through individuals of
relatively high socio-economic status.24 We can therefore modify
Sutherland's original definition of white collar crime to include both
individuals and organizations of respectability. Although Sutherland
did not establish clear criteria for distinguishing "high-status"
offenders from other offenders, his focus was on crime committed by
managers and other professionals employed by legitimate
businesses. 5
In seeking to explore the determinants of crime, Sutherland and
those who have followed in his steps have used "white collar crime"
as a means to question the theory that the origins of crime are status-
or class-based.26 As a practical description for the study of white
collar crime, however, the Sutherland definition is not particularly
helpful. It is difficult to draw a principled distinction, for example,
21. White collar criminal offenses are of course defined by both state and federal law.
Because this article focuses on United States Supreme Court cases, and most of those
involve federal statutes, it is upon those statutes that I focus. See Part III infra.
22. See Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1940).
23. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7
(1983). Following his 1939 address, Sutherland undertook a book-length study of white
collar crime, which was published in 1949. See Harvey W. Kushner, Book Review: White
Collar Crime: The Uncut Version, by Edwin H. Sutherland, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 509 (1984) (book review). At the behest of his employer and publisher,
Sutherland in the original version of WHITE COLLAR CRIME edited out the names and
descriptions of persons, corporations, and industries engaged in criminal activities. Id. at
509-10. The unedited version of the book was published in 1983.
24. See EDwIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION
(1983).
25. Distinguishing "respectable" from "non-respectable" organizations is not always
an easy task. In general, the latter would include corporations and other organizations
with institutionalized ties to crime, in particular to organized crime.
26. See Kushner, Book Review, supra note 23, at 510; James William Coleman, The
Theory of White-Collar Crime: From Sutherland to the 1990s, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
RECONSIDERED 53 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd, eds. 1992).
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between tax fraud committed by a corporation or one of its executives
and tax fraud committed by a person not of high socio-economic
status (however such status is defined). 27 Even if the conventional
wisdom relating to the Supreme Court's approach to white collar
cases is correct, presumably the Court would not establish one set of
rules for tax fraud committed by the rich and another set of rules for
everyone else (though of course it might apply the rules differently
depending on socio-economic status).
Nor does a status-based definition accurately delineate the group
of Supreme Court cases generally perceived to be "white collar"
cases. For example, some consider securities fraud committed by
means of insider trading2s to be the classic white collar crime.29 Yet,
the Court first addressed the subject in a case where the defendant
was not a corporate manager but a "markup man" for a printing
company.30 Or consider one of the Court's leading mail fraud cases,
where the defendant was a used-car distributor.3 ' In fact, many
"white collar" defendants, particularly in cases involving crimes such
as bank embezzlement and government benefits fraud, do not look
much different from defendants in many non-white collar cases.32
Sutherland's sociologically-oriented definition thus fails to provide a
workable framework for a substantive legal discussion of the types of
crimes that lawyers, attorneys and academics speak of as "white collar
offenses."
(2) Nature of the Conduct
Prosecutorial agencies and some scholars have defined "white
collar crime" not in terms of the offender's socio-economic status but
in terms of the nature of the offense charged. For example, in 1981
the United States Department of Justice employed the following
definition:
White-collar crime: Definition. Nonviolent crime for financial gain
27. See generally, Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd, ElMin Waring, & Nancy Bode,
White Collar Crimes and Criminals, 25 AM. CRIM. L. RtEV. 331, 345-47 (1988) (examining
the diversity among white collar defendants); SUSAN SHAPIRO, THINKING ABOUT
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: MATrERS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION AND RESEARCH 3 (1980).
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 16, at 9.
30. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd 455 U.S.
222 (1980).
31. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,707 (1989).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (food stamp fraud).
Compare Weisburd, supra note 29, at 3 (many white collar defendants are middle class),
with John Braithwaite, Crime and the Average American, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 215,216-
24 (1993) (interpreting Weisburd's data to show that "white collar" defendants are much
like non-white collar defendants).
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committed by means of deception by persons whose occupational
status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi-professional and
utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also,
nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and
committed by anyone having special technical and professional
knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the person's
occupation.3
3
By focusing on the use of "deception," both prongs of this
definition shift the emphasis from the defendant's socio-economic
status to the criminal means. Aspects of Sutherland's definition
remain, however, in the requirement that the defendants be at least
"semi-professional" or have "special technical and professional
knowledge." Again, this definition seems too limited. Many offenses
traditionally considered to be white collar crimes,34 including mail and
wire fraud,35 tax fraud, and bribery and extortion, can be and are
committed without either professional/semi-professional status or
special expertise or knowledge.
Others have attempted to define "white collar crime" solely as
crime based upon deceptive practices.3 6 For example, the United
States Chamber of Commerce has described white collar crime as
"illegal acts characterized by guile, deceit, and concealment-and are
not dependent upon the application of physical force or violence or
threats thereof. ' 37 But this definition also seems too narrow, for
some quintessential white collar crimes do not necessarily involve
deception.38
33. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 215 (2d ed. 1981). See also J.
Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 1 (1985); M. I. Dixon, The Re-
defining of White Collar Crime, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 561 (1995).
34. See, e.g., KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1990); PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1992).
35. See Dixon, The Re-Defining of White Collar Crime, supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., HERBERT EDELHERTz, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF
WHITE- COLLAR CRIME (1970); Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying
the Ambiguous, supra note 19, at 401 n.18 (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE
DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 121 (2d ed. 1981)) ("White
collar crime has been defined as 'nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means
of deception... 2") (emphasis added).
37. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 3
(1974).
38. For example, offenses involving official corruption, such as bribery and extortion,
do not necessarily require deception, except in the broadest sense that the violation of the
public trust is not revealed. But concealment of criminal purpose cannot, as a matter of
logic, be sufficient "deception" to help meaningfully limit the category of crimes we
consider "white collar." Nor do antitrust criminal violations, considered to be among the
classic "white collar crime," see Weisburd, Crimes of the Middle Class, supra note 29, at 9,
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(3) Practical Considerations
As an initial matter, once professional or social status is excised
from the definition, the term "white collar crime" is a misnomer.
Apart from sociological considerations that do not provide a helpful
basis for distinguishing cases for jurisprudential purposes, there
appears to be no principled way to distinguish among mail and wire
fraud and tax evasion schemes, for example, committed by those of
highly divergent social, economic, and professional positions.3 9
Nonetheless, I will use this term both because it is so widely accepted
and because it evokes in common perceptions a type of crime
different from the "street crime" that captures so much of the public's
attention.
Perhaps the most useful definition of "white collar crime" can be
derived from the real-world distinctions drawn by prosecutors and
defense counsel practicing in the field. In this context a prosecutor or
defense attorney could well best define "white collar crime" in terms
of what it is not. A white collar offense is one that does not
necessarily involve the use or threat of physical force, either against
the victim or the victim's property.40 Nor does "white collar crime"
encompass offenses directly related to the possession, sale, or
distribution of controlled substances.41 The term "white collar crime"
necessarily involve deception.
39. See generally, Wheeler, White Collar Crimes and Criminals, supra note 27, at 337-
50.
40. The American Bar Association has adopted a somewhat similar definition for what
it terms "economic offenses." See Gilbert Geis, White-Collar Crime-What Is It?, WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 31,39 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd, eds. 1992). The
ABA excludes from this definition crimes related to product manufacture and workplace
death and injury by noting that "economic offenses" are "nonviolent" in the sense "the
means by which crime is committed" is nonviolent, though the "harm to society can
frequently be described as violent." Because these crimes are often excluded from the
"white collar" category, see, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 29, at 17, 1 likewise exclude those
crimes from this study.
Note that, under this definition, whether a crime is white collar may turn not on the
statutory definition but on the means used. For example, under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§1951, crimes of extortion may sometimes be "white collar" (when "under color of official
right" or by use by threat of economic harm), see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2B3.2 (1997), and sometimes not (when committed by use or threat of physical
force), see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 (1997). See James Lindgren,
The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1695, 1695 (1993) (explaining the types of extortion). For an example of a broad use of
white collar extortion as a prosecution theory, see United States v. Garcia, 907 F.2d 380 (2d
Cir. 1990).
41. Although many such offenses do not involve the use of force, they are excluded
here both because of the common perception that the "drug culture" often has a violent
context, and because criminal investigations and prosecutions of these offenses are
typically handled by specialized agencies, e.g., the Drug Enforcement Agency, and units of
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also excludes crime directly related to organized crime activities.42
Finally, "white collar crime" excludes laws relating to certain policy-
driven areas such as immigration, civil rights, and national security,
and excludes common theft crimes.43
This definition of white collar crime is a broad one,
encompassing offenses from simple fraud using the mail and wires44 to
local political corruption cases45 and sophisticated securities and tax
casesA4 The definition dilutes the pure socio-economic focus of
"white collar crime," but comports both with the legal practice
world's and the general public's views of the distinction between
white collar and non-white collar crime. This definition also allows a
broad look at the Supreme Court's white collar cases, many of which
do not involve defendants who would meet Sutherland's criteria.47
In this context, distinguishing white collar defendants from other
defendants may not require comparing cases of elite vs. non-elite
defendants. Rather, the sets of cases may be distinguished as
primarily involving perpetrators of violent crime and drug-related
crime vs. others.48 If an examination of the Court's white collar cases
the Department of Justice. See Alex Y. Seita, The Role of Market Forces in Transnational
Violence, 60 ALB. L. REV. 635, 647 (1997) ("[Much of the violence associated with illegal
drugs stems from buyers who commit crimes to finance their drug purchases and from
drug dealers who use violence to protect and carry out their drug sales ... ."); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 960 (1991) ("Studies demonstrate the grave threat that illegal
drugs, and particularly cocaine, pose to society in terms of violence, crime, and social
displacement .... "); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,702 (1981) ("[TIhe execution of a
warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence .... "). To say that "white collar
crime" never relates to offenses involving controlled substances, however, would overstate
the matter. For example, in areas such as money laundering (18 U.S.C.A. § 1956) (1989)
and tax fraud (26 U.S.C. § 7201) (1977), a "white collar" offense might be directly related
to the proceeds of narcotics trafficking.
42. Again, this is not a pristine distinction, for organized crime can be non-violent and,
on the surface, conducted by "legitimate" businesses. As with controlled substance
offenses, however, organized crime often has a violent context, and is investigated and
prosecuted by specialized law enforcement See DAVID 0. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED
CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 188-90 (1996).
43. See Wheeler, White Collar Crimes and Criminals, supra note 27, at 332, n.5; Henry
Solomon, The Economist's Perspective of Economic Crime, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 641,
641 (1977).
44. For example, one of the most important cases interpreting the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341 and 1343) is Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S.
705 (1989), which involved a scheme to defraud used car buyers by odometer tampering.
45. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (extortion).
46. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (insider trading); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (tax fraud).
47. See Braithwaite, Crime and the Average American, supra note 32, at 219-21;
HAZEL CROALL, WHrrE COLLAR CRIME 48-50 (1992).
48. That is not to say that the two categories will be the same in demographic terms.
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supports this empirical observation, then the inquiry will be whether
the results in these cases are driven by a class bias different from that
identified by Sutherland, or whether some other variables determine
the outcomes. If the latter is true, the task will be to identify the
variables that produce the appearance of class bias but are in fact
more difficult to describe.
B. Issues of Categorization
(1) The Problem of Overlap
By defining "white collar crime" by type of criminal activity-or,
more accurately, by excluding types of criminal activities from the
term "white collar"-the focus shifts from the characteristics of the
defendant to the characteristics of the crime. Often, this distinction
works relatively easily; securities fraud and tax fraud, for example, are
"paper" crimes that are "white collar" by nature.
Some offenses, however, can be either white collar or non-white
collar and some issues in white collar cases do not observe these neat
categories. For example, some of the most important Supreme Court
cases interpreting federal conspiracy statutes have arisen in the white
collar crime context,49 and a conspiracy count is typically included in a
white collar indictment.50 Governing legal principles in these cases,
however, also apply to any federal conspiracy case, white collar or
not. The substantive crime of extortion likewise involves some
offenses that may be "white collar" offenses and others that may not
be.51 Also, the "cover-up" offenses of perjury,52 false declarations,53
Studies have shown that white collar defendants are more likely to be white and male,
better educated, and older than other defendants. "Compared to their representation in
the defendant population (41.5%), Whites were over represented in numerous offense
categories. They constituted between 47 and 76 percent of white collar offenses." UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1994). See Weisburd, supra
note 12, at 50-51. Conversely, however, a great many white collar defendants do look
much like the defendants in non-white collar cases, and the group of white collar
defendants as a whole tends to be much more diverse than the common perception would
allow. See Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 219-21.
49. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (general principles of
vicarious liability) (tax fraud); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (general
principles of single and multiple conspiracies) (financial fraud against the United States).
50. See Mark Pomerantz & Otto G. Obermaier, Defending Charges of Conspiracy, in
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES, § 4.01, at 4-3 (Otto G.
Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo, eds., 1998) ("[allmost without exception, an indictment
charging a 'white collar' or economic regulatory offense will contain a conspiracy count").
In an off-cited passage in Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925), Judge
Learned Hand described conspiracy as "that darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery."
51. See supra note 40.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
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and obstruction of justice54 fall with the definition of "white collar"
offenses used here, and often arise in white collar cases.55 When such
charges arise in cases of violent crime, they lose their "white collar"
association. Finally, the broad-ranging criminal provisions of the
RICO56 and money laundering statutes 7 are most often used outside
the white collar context, but of course can apply in the white collar
context.58 Again, though, governing legal principles will apply in the
white collar and non-white collar contexts.
With substantive federal statutes that criminalize white collar
and non-white collar crime, the Court is establishing rules that, on
their face, apply across-the-board. In assessing voting patterns in
white collar and non-white collar cases, the task is to remain aware
that some issues will apply to both sets of cases, and to take this
overlap into account in the final evaluation.
(2) "Substance" vs. "Procedure"
The substantial majority of the criminal cases the Supreme Court
decides turn on "procedural" issues that arise in the prosecution of
drug crimes and violent crimes.59 Only a small percentage of the
Court's criminal cases involves white collar defendants. Conversely,
partly because white collar crimes are typically investigated by grand
juries rather than by police, most of the Supreme Court's white collar
cases deal with "substantive" issues, such as statutory interpretation,
rather than procedural issues.6° But there are many nominally
"procedural" issues, relating primarily to grand jury and self-
incrimination matters, that arise in the white collar context. In
comparing sets of cases, then, the most useful approach is to employ
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1994).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994).
55. See generally, Brickey, supra note 34, at 279-362.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. 1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(Supp. 1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1968 (1994).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. 1996); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991) (RICO).
59. For example, in 1974 the Court heard eighteen federal criminal cases. Fourteen of
those cases involved procedural issues, including double jeopardy, right to jury trial,
searches and seizures, and stop and arrests. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 280 (1975). The 1987 Term included twelve federal criminal cases; nine of which
were procedural in nature. The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 357
(1988). In 1995, the Court's review of state criminal cases all involved procedural issues
such as due process and searches and seizures. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4,376 (1996).
60. See note 97 infra and accompanying text. For an example of the rare criminal
procedure case arising in the white collar context, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976) (defendant was charged with the crime of false pretenses and his offices were
searched pursuant to warrant).
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the white collar/non-white collar categories, while recognizing that
the substance vs. procedure distinction both muddies the categories'
boundaries and cuts across the categories.
For purposes of comparing white collar and non-white collar
cases, then, the question arises as to whether such a comparison is
valid. If most non-white collar cases involve procedural issues, and
most white collar cases involve interpretation of substantive federal
criminal statutes, then perhaps any disparity in outcomes or voting
patterns rests not on the "white collar" distinction but on the
procedure vs. substance distinction. We might quickly conclude, for
example, that the white collar paradox turns primarily on Chief
Justice Rehnquist's oft-noted view, articulated in a memorandum he
wrote as a clerk to Justice Jackson, that "defendants who are as
'guilty as sin' should not go free simply because of a 'technical'
mistake by prosecutors or police."' 61 As discussed more fully in Part
IV, conservative members of the Court might thus be more inclined
to affirm convictions when the issue is a procedural one rather than a
substantive one.62
I believe, though, that comparison is useful based on the white
collar/non-white collar distinction even if the non-white collar sample
may be skewed towards procedural cases.63 First, relative to the
number of state criminal prosecutions, the number of federal criminal
prosecutions is quite small.64 The state cases that proceed to the
United States Supreme Court of course will generally turn on federal
constitutional criminal procedural issues, and will relatively rarely
involve interpretations of substantive state criminal statutes. 65 As a
practical matter, the universe of criminal cases decided by the
61. David G. Savage, Rehnquist Wins Confession Battle, L.A. TIMES, March 30, 1991,
at A2. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARv. L. REv. 152, 170-71 (1991) ("[tlhe
Fulminante Court correctly perceived a great deal of public intolerance for the justice
system, stemming in large part from the view that too many guilty people escape justice
because of technicalities); Harvard Law Review Association, Probable Cause-Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause: County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
187, 196 (1991) ("the primary impetus behind the Rehnquist Court's counter-revolution
[is] that guilty criminals should not go free because of Fourth Amendment technicalities").
62. Whether the nature of the legal issue-rather than the variations between the
white collar and non-white collar contexts-can explain the white collar paradox is
discussed more fully infra p. IV.
63. See Appendix, Table 1.
64. One 1997 study estimated federal prosecutions at 35,000 per year, well less than
five percent of all prosecutions nationally. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg,
Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of
Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921,970 (1997).
65. The exception would be a federal constitutional challenge to such a statute. See,
e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
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Supreme Court is all there is to work with. Second, the
procedural/substantive distinction implicit in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's criticism is often more apparent than real. In a number
of areas, including issues relating to corporate and individual
liability,66 the Fifth Amendment,67 and grand juries,61 it is impossible
to distinguish clearly between "substance" and "procedure. '69
(3) "Civil" vs. "Criminal"
The final categorization issue is whether "civil" cases-those that
do not involve a substantive criminal charge-are properly included
within the comparison. I do include them, for the obvious reason that
the Court's rulings in civil cases arising under such statutes as the
securities laws70 govern criminal cases in those areas as well. I also
include quasi-procedural civil cases where the issues in those cases-
involving the self-incrimination clause 7' and grand juries72-affect
rights of parties to criminal proceedings. Once again, the white collar
vs. non-white collar distinction is less than pristine.
The next inquiry is whether the justices' apparent shifts in
philosophies between white collar and non-white collar cases rests
upon an inherent difference between the two sets of cases, or is tied
to some other variable, such as "substance" vs. "procedure" or "civil"
vs. "criminal." Even if the latter appears to be the case, the task is to
determine which characteristics seem to determine the outcomes, and
why.
66. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (established the test for
corporate responsibility under strict liability statutes).
67. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (a corporate custodian is not
entitled to resist a subpoena on the ground that his act of production will be personally
incriminating).
68. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991) (the Court decided
what standards to apply when a party seeks to avoid compliance with a subpoena duces
tecum issued in connection with a grand jury investigation); United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36 (1992) (district court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the
prosecutor failed to disclose to the grand jury "substantial exculpatory evidence").
69. For discussions of various aspects of the substance/procedure distinction, see Akhil
Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123
(1996); Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269 (1998); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner
Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996);
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. 393
(1995).
70. See, e.g., Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); and
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
71. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
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H. Criminal Justice Philosophies in Non-White Collar Cases
To fulfill this article's purposes, I have focused the white
collar/non-white collar case comparison primarily on the years from
1971 to 1994. I have done this for two reasons. First, as discussed
above, it was in the 1970s that the government began its "war" on
white collar crime,73 and that white collar criminal issues began to
come before the Court regularly. Second, it was during this period
that the Court's criminal law ideological division was particularly
pronounced; current-Chief Justice Rehnquist ascended to the Court
as an associate justice in 1971,74 and Justice Blackmun retired in
1994.75 After the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall in
1990 and 1991, this ideological division was not as distinct as it was for
most of the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, certain divisions have
existed on the Court throughout the time of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. Finally, I do review several important recent white
collar and non-white collar cases, with a view to assessing the current
Court's likely voting patterns in these cases.
A. Voting Patterns
In non-white collar cases, the common views of the individual
justices' philosophies-"conservative" (pro-government), 76 "liberal"
73. See supra Part I.A. & note 19.
74. After William Rehnquist served for fifteen years as an Associate Justice, President
Ronald Reagan on June 17, 1986 nominated him to be Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. The Senate confirmed the appointment on September 17,1986.
75. Justice White retired in 1993, and was replaced by Justice Ginsburg; Justice
Blackmun retired in 1994, and was replaced by Justice Breyer. For an overview of Justice
Blackmun's move to the left in criminal cases in the last years of his tenure, see Wasby,
supra note 2.
76. In criminal cases from 1986 to 1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted for the
government in 80.7% of the cases, Justice Thomas voted for the government 77% of the
time, and Justice Scalia sided with the government in criminal cases 70.8% of the time.
These percentages are compiled from a yearly article entitled Supreme Court Voting
Behavior. See Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J.
PUB. L. 15 (1988); Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1987 Term, 3 BYU J.
PUB. L. 59 (1989); Robert E. Riggs & Mark T. Urban, Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1988 Term, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1990); Robert E. Riggs & Mark T. Urban, Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 1989 Term, 5 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1991); Robert E. Riggs & Guy L. Black,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1990 Term, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992); Richard G.
Wilkins, James L. Kimball I & Troy R. Braegger, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991
Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1993); Richard G. Wilkins, Troy R. Braegger & James L.
Kimball III, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1992 Term, 8 BYU J. PUB. L 229 (1994);
Richard G. Wilkins, James L. Kimball III & Scott M. Petersen, Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 269 (1995); Richard G. Wilkins, Scott M.
Petersen, Matthew K. Richards & Ronald J. Tocchini, Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 (1995); Richard G. Wilkins, Matthew K.
Richards & Scott Worthington, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 HASTINGS
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pro-defense) 77-are consistently borne out by the statistics from last
25 years. To understand why the voting patterns have taken shape as
they have, we must carefully examine the philosophies and rhetoric of
a sampling of key non-white collar cases during this time.78 The table
below examines the justices' voting patterns in fifty-five major cases
from 1972 to 1996, ranked from most to least pro-defendant:
CONST. L. Q. 1 (1996).
77. Justice Brennan voted for the government in criminal cases only 12.4% of the
time. Marshall voted for the government in only 11.5% of the cases. Stevens was pro-
government in criminal cases 30.5% of the time. Blackmun was pro-government in 34.5%
of criminal cases before the Court. Id.
78. Whether imagery and rhetoric are the product of ideology or whether the reverse
is true, and whether this is the right question to ask in the first instance, are fascinating
theoretical questions. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal
Law: The Relationship Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal
Law in Southern Antebellum and Modem Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165,
1214-27 (1995). These debates, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. The
questions here are why the justices say such different things, and decide issues in such
different ways, in the white collar vs. non-white collar cases.
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Voting patterns in non-white collar criminal cases 79
Majority or Dissenting
______ Concuring- ___--
Name For For For For Total % pro % %pro %in
Gov Def Gov Def Cases Gov Def maj
Marshall 4 12 0 42 58 6.90% 93.10% 27.59%
Brennan 6 10 0 36 52 11.54% 88.46% 30.77%
Stevens 19 14 0 26 59 32.20% 67.80% 55.93%
Blackmun 36 9 3 9 57 68.42% 31.58% 78.95%
O'Connor 33 9 4 3 49 75.51% 24.49% 85.71%
White 40 9 4 5 58 75.86% 24.14% 84.48%
Powell 30 7 3 2 42 78.57% 21.43% 88.10%
Burger 25 6 3 1 35 80.00% 20.00% 88.57%
Rehnquist 45 4 11 1 61 91.80% 8.20% 80.33%
Scalia 22 2 5 0 29 93.10% 6.90% 82.76%
At the ideological extremes, the justices' voting patterns in these
cases are startlingly consistent. Justices Marshall and Brennan
consistently-and, generally, in losing causes-voted for the
defendants in these cases; Justice Stevens also usually did so, but less
consistently. At the other extreme, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia
were the most consistent in their support of the government's
position, following in reverse order by the justices listed above them
in the table. The next sections examine a sampling of the cases used
to compile this table.
B. Non-White Collar Cases
(1) Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment Issues
My sample of non-white collar criminal procedure cases,
primarily relating to pre-trial investigation, was easily drawn; I simply
took the major Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment cases from some
widely-used casebooks on federal constitutional criminal procedure. 80
79. See Appendix, Table 1. I have excluded some justices-Stewart, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer-where the samples were too small to compare them with
the other justices' voting.
80. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOviCZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (2d ed. 1994);
RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS, & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL
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Examination of a few key cases illustrates how the justices'
philosophies were articulated in this context.
Few issues have so sharply divided the Court in this area as the
substance and scope of the exclusionary rule, which potentially bars
the introduction at trial of illegally-obtained evidence. The Court's
1984 decision in United States v. Leon8' is a milestone in that debate.
That case established the long-anticipated2--or long-dreaded,
depending on your point of view83 - "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule, under which the products of a search based upon a
warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause will not be excluded
from trial if the officers conducting the search or seizure acted in
good faith.84
The practical implications of Leon for criminal defendants are, of
course, enormous, and comport with Chief Justice Rehnquist's view
that the "guilty" criminal should not go free based on mere
technicalities.8 5 That this policy, which extols truth-finding over
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS AND RELATED AREAS (3d ed. 1995). For a discussion of the Court's
general pro-government orientation in criminal procedure cases, see Christopher
Slobogin, Having it Both Ways: Proof that the U.S. Supreme Court is "Unfairly"
Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743 (1996).
81. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 250 (1983) (White, J., concurring) ("[a]s a
jurisdictional requirement, I have no doubt that the exclusionary rule question is before us
.... As a prudential matter, I am unmoved by the Court's lengthy discourse as to why it
must avoid the question .... ")
83. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[iut now appears that the
Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete").
84. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. The Leon decision brought to fruition the Court's
efforts to deconstitutionalize the exclusionary rule that had begun with the 1974 decision
in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974) (the exclusionary rule "is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved"). Prior
to that time, the Court had held that the exclusionary rule-forbidding the introduction at
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures-was compelled by the Fourth Amendment itself. See
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (the Court first adopted the exclusionary rule,
holding that evidence obtained by federal law enforcement officers in violation of Fourth
Amendment can not be used in a federal criminal trial against the victim of the official
misconduct); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applied the Weeks exclusionary rule to
the states on the basis that the rule is mandated by the text of the Fourth Amendment).
The Leon holding confirmed the new view that the exclusionary rule is merely a judicially-
created rule designed to deter future police misconduct, not a constitutionally-based rule
designed to redress a constitutional violation. See 468 U.S. at 905 (quoting United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974)).
85. See Jenelle London Joset, May It Please the Constitution: Judicial Activism and Its
Effect on Criminal Procedure, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1996) ("The judicially active
Court did not want a seemingly guilty man to go free because of a law enforcement
officer's mistake. Therefore, the Court created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
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"technical" rights, drove the Leon decision is apparent on its face:
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source
of concern .... An objectionable collateral consequence of this
interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function
is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced
sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. Particularly when
law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their
transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit
conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system.86
Justice Brennan's dissent was not gentle in setting forth its view
that the Leon majority had undermined a basic constitutional
principle:
[I]n case after case, I have witnessed the Court's gradual but
determined strangulation of the [exclusionary] rule. It now appears
that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete.
That today's decision represents the piece de resistance of the
Court's past efforts cannot be doubted, for today the Court
sanctions the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of illegally
obtained evidence against the individual whose rights have been
violated-a result that had previously been thought to be
foreclosed.87
Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. In a
separate dissent, Justice Stevens took a different tack, hitting the
majority for ignoring original intent and suffering from "constitutional
amnesia. '88 The Leon opinions thus are cloaked in the usual
Rehnquist-Court Fourth Amendment debate language; the majority
decries the social cost of letting the guilty go free, while the dissents
predict that Fourth Amendment rights will be eviscerated because of
the majorities' policy-driven, result-oriented analyses.89
rule."); Ogletree, supra note 61, at 171; and Harvard Law Review Association, supra note
59 at 196. For judicial examples of this philosophy, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,311
& 318 (1985) ("This Court has never held that the psychological impact of voluntary
disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness
of a subsequent informed waiver.. .") (emphasis added); and Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533 (1988) (holding that evidence discovered during an unlawful search and
subsequently obtained during a valid search is admissible if the valid search was
independent of the unlawful search).
86. 468 U.S. at 907-08 (emphasis added).
87. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
89. That Leon is a controversial decision is proven nowhere more forcefully than in
those states that have rejected its holding, and continue to apply the exclusionary rule
under their respective state constitutions even where the police have acted upon a warrant
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Other Fourth Amendment decisions cut more directly to the
chase. In these cases, the dissents chastise the majority decisions for
ignoring the possibility of race- and class-based abuse by law
enforcement, while the majority decisions proclaim the need for
greater flexibility for law enforcement, particularly in the "war on
drugs." In Florida v. Bostick,9° for example, the six- justice majority
opinion authored by Justice O'Connor concluded that the defendant
was not necessarily "seized" when drug-patrol officers approached
him on a bus and asked to search his luggage.91 Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens in dissent, responded by
accusing the majority of sacrificing individual rights to the "war on
drugs." 92 Justice Marshall also directly injected race into the case:
[T]he police who conduct these sweeps decline to offer a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing sufficient
to justify a warrantless 'stop' or 'seizure' of the confronted
passenger. It does not follow, however, that the approach of
passengers during a sweep is completely random. Indeed, at least
one officer who routinely confronts interstate travelers candidly
admitted that race is a factor influencing his decision whom to
approach. Thus, the basis of the decision to single out particular
passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be
inarticulable than unspeakable.93
The other examples of this deep ideological division on the Court
are too numerous to summarize here. The split between the
Rehnquist/majority view and that of the Marshall/Brennan (and
sometimes) Stevens dissents occurs in areas including searches and
seizures, Miranda rights,94 Sixth Amendment right-of-confrontation, 95
in good faith. See, e.g., State of Minnesota v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 21 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996); State of New Mexico v. Gurrola, 908 P.2d 264, 267 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Carroll v.
State of Texas, 911 S.W.2d 210,223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
90. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). For an overview of issues arising in the "war" on drugs, see
Patricia Wald, A Report from the Front in the War on Drugs, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
(1990).
91. 501 U.S. at 439-440. Florida law enforcement officials acted pursuant to a policy
under which they routinely boarded buses and asked passengers for consent to search
their luggage. The majority found that "working" buses is a legitimate technique in drug-
control efforts, refused to find that Mr. Bostick was necessarily seized, and remanded the
case. Because the officers had no particularized suspicion as to Mr. Bostick, the search of
his luggage was illegal if he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes; Terry requires
individualized suspicion before an officer may detain or "stop" a suspect. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
92. 501 U.S. at 440-445 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. l at 442 n.1 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
94. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984) (Miranda warnings need not
be given prior to custodial questioning in a situation posing a threat to the public safety,
i.e., when there is an "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from
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and protections of due process under the Fifth Amendment. 96
There are few Supreme Court cases that involve white collar
criminal defendants and turn on general procedural issues. This is
perhaps not surprising in light of the relatively prolonged nature of
white collar criminal investigations, which typically gather evidence
through use of grand jury subpoenas rather than searches pursuant to
a warrant.97 In one search and seizure case involving a white collar
defendant, the Court split along familiar conservative/pro-
government, liberal/pro-defendant lines.98 And in two cases each
arising under the Fifth Amendment's due process and Sixth
Amendment's right-to-counsel provisions,99 the Court split along
those same lines to deny the defendants' claims in an area of
significant concern to white collar defendants and their attorneys.
It is not surprising that, in procedural decisions affecting the
cases across a broad spectrum of the law, including white collar crime,
neither wing of the Court would even implicitly grant significance to
the particular defendant's socio-economic status. For example, rules
of Fourth Amendment interpretation, even in the occasional case
where they arise in the white collar context, will have little impact in
typical white collar cases. These issue are much more important to
the non-white collar cases given that the vast majority of search and
seizure cases the Court decides are controlled-substance cases,100 and
immediate danger").
95. A recent Sixth Amendment case, decided by a five-to-four vote, split generally
along predictable ideological lines, with Justice O'Connor providing the "swing" vote. See
Gray v. United States, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998). Justice Breyer wrote the pro-
defendant majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg.
96. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
97. See William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 787-92
(1988).
98. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
99. In these companion cases, United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), and
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), the five-member
majorities rejected due process and right-to-counsel challenges to pretrial orders, issued
under the RICO criminal forfeiture statute, freezing funds needed to pay the defendants'
attorneys' fees. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. In language indicative of his then-recent shift to the left
in criminal cases, see supra note 3, Justice Blackmun wrote that "it is unseemly and unjust
for the Government to beggar those it prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial."
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 635. For an overview of these decisions' impact
in white collar cases, see Diana Parker & J. Kelly Strader, Civil & Criminal Forfeitures, in
WHITE COLLAR CRIME, BusINEss AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 6A.03[5] (Otto
Obermaier & Robert Morvillo, eds., 1998).
100. A review of search and seizure cases for the years of 1992 through June 22, 1998
reveals that there were fifteen search and/or seizure cases. Of the fifteen cases, ten
involved controlled substances (Richards v. Wisconsin, - U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997);
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996);
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most of the rest involve crimes of violence against persons or
property.101
That is not to say, however, that social, economic, and racial
issues do not explicitly come up in search and seizure cases. As noted
in the discussion of Florida v. Bostick,102 the dissenters have on
occasion noted the impact of the Court's decisions on racialminorities. Further, the dissenters have also opined, in particular
cases, that law enforcement's biases-based on race and/or socio-
economic factors-provide a reason for not contracting the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections. For example, in United States v.
Robinson,0 3 Justice Marshall dissented, along with Justices Brennan
and Douglas, from a holding that a search incident to lawful arrest,
justified by the protection of the officer, can extend into containers
found on the arrestee's body and taken into possession by the
officer.1°4 Justice Marshall wrote:
The government argues that it is difficult to see what
constitutionally protected 'expectation of privacy' a prisoner has in
the interior of a cigarette pack. One wonders if the result in this
case would have been the same were respondent a businessman
who was lawfully taken into custody for driving without a license
and whose wallet was taken from him by the police.... Or suppose
a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found to have a
sealed envelope on his person. Would it be permissible for the
arresting officer to tear open the envelope in order to make sure
that it did not contain a clandestine weapon...?105
In those procedural cases not focused on white collar crime, then,
the ideological split on the Court seems clear: the truth-seeking,
"technicality"-averse conservatives vs. the defendants' rights, process-
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996);
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); and
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993)).
101. The same review of 1992 through 1998 cases showed that three of the remaining
five involved violence (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, - U.S. -,
118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998); United States v. Ramirez, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 994 (1998); and
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993)). The remaining cases were Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305 (1997), and Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Both of
these cases involved drug testing, one of candidates for public office and the other of high
school athletes.
102. 501 U.S. 429 (1991); see supra note 3.
103. 414 U.S. 218,238 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. The Robinson defendant was stopped on suspicion of driving without a license,
and was arrested for narcotics possession after a search incident to his arrest revealed
narcotics in a cigarette pack the officer found on his person. Id. at 240-241.
105. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
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oriented liberals.1°6 To the extent that the Warren Court's search and
seizure decisions were the product of perceived law enforcement
abuse of minorities, particularly African- Americans, 1°7 it makes sense
that social and racial considerations sometimes rise to the surface of
some opinions, as in the Bostick and Robinson dissents discussed
above.
(2) Remaining Criminal Law Issues
In non-white collar cases before the Court, "substantive"
criminal law issues most frequently involve the application of federal
constitutional provisions to state statutes. In several ways, such cases
are not precisely analogous to the "substantive" white collar cases the
Court has decided. First, most of the non-white collar cases do not
involve the statutory interpretation issues that arise in federal white
collar cases.1°8 Second, many of the cases are at once substantive (in
that they affect the scope of criminal liability rather than the evidence
to be introduced at trial) and procedural (in that they concern
procedural aspects of constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants, such as due process). 10 9 Finally, many of these cases,
although criminal in nature, also involve constitutional protections
broader than those specifically afforded criminal defendants.110
Again, however, even though precise comparisons may not be
possible, the voting patterns of the justices in these cases again offer a
fascinating contrast to the patterns in the white collar cases.
106. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. 897, discussed supra notes 86-89.
107. See generally Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on
Justice Marshall's View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 369 (1994); Harcourt,
supra note 78.
108. Issues of statutory interpretation of state statutes are, of course, generally resolved
at the state court level, unless there is a federal constitutional claim. In terms of the
Court's certiorari jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994), provides:
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in
question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up
or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any
commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
Relatively rarely do federal statutory construction issues arise in non-white collar criminal
cases. For examples of such issues, see infra note 359.
109. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), discussed infra Part II.C.1.
110. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed infra Part II.C.1.
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(a) Substantive and Procedural Due Process
Substantive due process may limit the degree to which the
government can criminalize certain activities. For example, in Bowers
v. Hardwick"' the Court rejected the defendant's challenge to a
Georgia law that criminalized consensual, private, non-commercial
sexual activities between persons of the same sex. The majority
opinion was written by Justice White, and was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Powell."2 The dissent
was written by Justice Blackmun, who was joined by the usual
criminal case dissenters, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens.
In a more recent case, the Court evaluated the scope of a
defendant's rights in an area not easily classified as "substance" or
"procedure." The case was Montana v. Egelhoff"3 and involved a
challenge to a statute that provides that a defendant's "intoxicated
condition" cannot be considered "in determining the existence of a
mental state which is an element of the offense."" 4 Justice Scalia
wrote the four-member plurality opinion, in which he was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. The
plurality concluded the defendant had failed to establish a due
process "right" to introduce this evidence because any such right did
not rise to the level of a "fundamental principle of justice.""n 5 In her
opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Ginsburg described the
issue not as evidentiary but as substantive; the question revolved
around the state's power to define an element of a crime. 116 Because
the state had merely legislatively determined how to define the
mental element of the crime of homicide, no principle of due process
was violated. 117
111. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The challenge was based upon the right-to-privacy cases from
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678
(1977). The Court found that the private activities at issue in Hardwick, unlike the
previous cases, did not involve a "fundamental right" and was justified on the rational
basis of enforcing morality. Id at 196.
112. After he retired from the Court, Justice Powell stated that he believed the Court's
decision in Hardwick had been in error. See Anand Agneshwar, Powell Concedes Error in
Key Privacy Ruling; Vote to Sustain Sodomy Law at High Court Called a 'Mistake', N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 26,1990, at 1, col.3.
113. 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
114. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 41. The defendant argued that he was entitled, under the
due process clause, to argue at his murder trial that his intoxication rendered him
incapable of possessing the requisite mental state.
115. See id. at 51 ("Although the rule allowing a jury to consider evidence of a
defendant's voluntary intoxication where relevant to mens rea has gained considerable
acceptance, it is of too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and
permanent allegiance to qualify as fundamental ... .
116. See id. at 57 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
117. See id. at 59 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The dissent was written by Justice
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The Egelhoff decision is interesting on many levels,1 8 but one of
the most intriguing aspects of the case is the vote split. It is apparent
that the clear liberal/conservative split that existed during most of the
1970s and 1980s is no longer. Most obviously, the retirements of
Justices Marshall and Brennan have left the Court without its most
consistently pro-defendants' rights justices. In addition, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy have moved to the center on many issues,
and can no longer consistently be counted upon to join the
conservative wing.119 Finally, to the extent generalizations can be
made so soon in their tenures, it appears that neither Justice Ginsburg
nor Justice Breyer will follow a consistently liberal approach in
criminal cases. 12
(b) Eighth Amendment
Across the range of Eighth Amendment cases, the standard
O'Connor, who was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. The dissent reasoned
that the defendant's ability to present his defense had been impeded, and that the state
had been relieved of its constitutionally-mandated burden to prove each element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Montana
statute places a blanket exclusion on a category of evidence that would allow the accused
to negate the offense's mental-state element.... [I]t frees the prosecution, in the face of
such evidence, from having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
nevertheless possessed the required mental state.").
118. This case has produced substantial commentary. See, e.g., Jeffrey Scott Robinette,
Montana v. Egelhoffi Abandoning a Defendant's Fundamental Right to Present a Defense,
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1349 (1997); Robert J. McManus, Montana v. Egelhoff" Voluntary
Intoxication, Morality, and the Constitution, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1245 (1997); Brett G.
Sweitzer, Implicit Redefinitions, Evidentiary Proscriptions, and Guilty Minds: Intoxicated
Wrongdoers After Montana v. Egelhoff, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1997).
119. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy joined the majority, holding that a law enforcement officer cannot reinitiate an
interrogation without counsel present regardless of whether or not the defendant has
consulted with counsel); United States v. Gray, discussed supra note 95 (O'Connor joined
liberal majority).
120. See Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal
Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2282 (1998) (book review) ("The recent
'liberal' Clinton appointees to the Supreme Court seem as unfriendly to criminal
procedure liberalism as their conservative colleagues ... ."). There is some evidence that
Justice Ginsburg allies herself with the center/right in criminal cases as often as with the
center/left, and that Justice Breyer appears to be more consistently with the center/left in
criminal cases. See Lady Justice: Her Commitment to The Underdog May Bring Ruth
Bader Ginsburg The Court's Top Job, THE DETROIT NEWS, January 3, 1997, at El
("While she's part of the moderately liberal wing of the court-along with Justices
Stephen Breyer, David Souter and John Paul Stevens-she's been conservative in criminal
cases"); and Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court
Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1, 7 (1996) ("[T]he relatively high degree of consensus
in criminal justice cases created strong interagreement among the individual justices across
the board. Two particular voting blocs emerged among the justices, one conservative
(Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor) and one moderate (Souter and Breyer)").
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liberal/conservative split holds with remarkable consistency. At this
point, we have moved beyond cases that provide law enforcement
with wide latitude to development evidence. Here, rather, the focus
seems to be on deferring to legislative bodies, particularly those at the
state level, in establishing appropriate levels of punishment.
The death penalty, of course, raises unique Eighth Amendment
concerns. Though a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court's
death penalty cases is far beyond this paper's scope, a quick review of
some of the major cases further reinforces the standard split in
criminal cases. In 1972, the Court held for the first time that the
death penalty, as then administered, violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments.' 121
The five-to-four decision split along standard lines.'2 Four years
later, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from a decision
upholding the death penalty, finding it unconstitutional in every
instance.123 That same year, however, five members of the Court
found mandatory death penalties to be unconstitutional,124 over a
strong dissent.'25 In a six-to-three vote, the Court reached the same
decision eleven years later, in the case in which a person serving a life
term without parole committed a murder in prison. 26 Finally, in 1987
the Court rejected a challenge to the death penalty on the ground that
it is racially-biased. 27 Once again, the five-to-four vote was along
predictable lines, with Justice Blackmun having joined the usual
liberal alliance of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
Outside the death penalty context, the Eighth Amendment cases
have produced remarkably similar results. In two important decisions
issued a decade apart, the Court sustained, against Eighth
Amendment challenges, life sentences for a third felony (obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses)12s and for a first-time narcotics transaction
121. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
122. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, White, and Stewart supported this holding;
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented. Nowhere
was Justice Blackmun's move left in criminal cases more apparent than in the death
penalty cases. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). In Callins, Justice Blackmun announced that he believed that
the death penalty, in every case, is unconstitutional.
123. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (Justices Stewart, Powell,
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall joined in the holding).
125. See id. at 306 (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist
dissented).
126. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (Justice Blackmun wrote the majority
opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia dissented).
127. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
128. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens dissented).
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(sale of 650 grams of cocaine). 29 Both cases were decided by five-to-
four margins, with three liberals and one moderate dissenting in each
case. Finally, in one recent case decided under the Eighth
Amendment's excessive fines clause, a five-member majority of
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Thomas invalidated a
criminal forfeiture.130
C. Common Patterns in the Non-White Collar Cases
In broad categories of non-white collar criminal cases, then, the
United States Supreme Court justices have voted with remarkable
consistency over roughly the last twenty-five years. Although there
are notable exceptions,131 these patterns hold true in cases ranging
from purely "procedural" cases involving the introduction of evidence
based upon police investigation to "substantive" cases that define the
scope of a defendant's potential liability and assess the potential
limits on punishment.
The "conservative" justices prevailed in the vast majority of
these cases, in which certain themes emerge. In the "procedural"
cases, the opinions generally seek to give wide latitude to police in the
investigation of criminal activities, citing both the difficulty of law
enforcement and the need of society to investigate and prosecute
criminals successfully.132 These decisions focus on police conduct, not
on the role of prosecutors or on the statutes the government is
enforcing. 133 The "substantive" cases focus on issues ranging from
definitions of crimes to the limitations on the states' abilities to render
certain activities criminal and to punish.'3 The focus in these cases is
129. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
and Marshall dissented).
130. See United States v. Bajakajian, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (1998). See Part I,
note 7 supra, for a discussion of this unusual line-up.
131. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (Justice Scalia wrote a majority
opinion, joined by the liberal justices, finding a search to be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Miranda is now the law of the land and, in my view, the Court has not
provided sufficient justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear
strictures.").
132. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("Moreover,
characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a 'seizure,' while
not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly
unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. The
Court has on other occasions referred to the acknowledged need for police questioning as
a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws").
133. See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors To Go?, 54 U. PrITr. L. REV.
405,408 (1993).




not on the effectiveness of law enforcement but on the role of states
in defining and enforcing criminal laws. Thus, judicial restraint is a
common conservative theme.135
On the other hand, the liberal dissents' focus on the importance
of individual rights is consistent across the range of non-white collar
cases. In the procedural cases, the dissents consistently lament the
majorities' short-shrifting of constitutional protections afforded
criminal defendants.136 In the substantive cases, the dissents seek to
read narrowly the permissible scope of the criminal laws, to afford
defendants the ability to present a defense at trial, and to place
restraints on punishment. 37 The states' overwhelming power to
intrude on individual rights both in investigating and prosecuting
criminal cases is the reason, according to these dissents, 38 that
constitutional protections must be carefully safeguarded.
The next section focuses on criminal justice rhetoric and
philosophies in white collar cases. As we will see, the
liberal/conservative themes apparent in the non-white collar cases do
not translate into clearly-definable approaches to white collar crime.
HI. Criminal Justice Philosophies in White Collar Cases
Since 1971, the Court has decided far too many white collar cases
to discuss here.139 So, I have made a highly selective, and subjective,
determination of some of the most interesting and important white
collar cases. Among these cases, I have selected a broad cross-
section, from complex securities cases to a relatively simple case of
food stamp fraud. They also include, as indicated in Part I above,
nominally "civil" cases. Finally, as with the non-white collar cases,
these range from purely substantive cases to cases that could more
fairly be termed "procedural." I believe, though, that one conclusion
135. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 ("[This case] raises no question about the right or
propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual
sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds.
The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. The case also calls
for some judgment about the limits of the Court's role in carrying out its constitutional
mandate.").
136. See supra note 133.
137. See supra note 134.
138. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I believe we must
analyze Hardwick's claim in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional right to
privacy. If that right means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its
citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more
than assert that the choice they have made is an 'abominable crime not fit to be named
among Christians."').
139. The white collar cases here are a fraction of the total. See Appendix, Table 2.
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is irrefutable: across the spectrum of these cases, we see both (a)
voting patterns (pro-defense or pro-government) by individual
justices, and (b) alignments of blocs of justices, that rarely occur
elsewhere in the Court's criminal law jurisprudence.
A. Voting Patterns
The justices' voting patterns in the white collar arena are not as
consistent as with the non-white collar cases summarized in the table
in the previous section. Nonetheless, certain patterns are clear:
Voting patterns in white collar crime cases'4o
Majority or Dissenting
Concurring
Name For For For For Total % pro % pro % in maj
Gov Def Gov Def Cases G D
Burger 5 2 3 0 10 80.00% 20.00% 70.00%
Blaclanun 8 4 6 1 19 73.68% 26.32% 63.16%
White 10 7 2 0 19 63.16% 36.84% 89.47%
Kennedy 4 4 1 0 9 55.56% 44.44% 88.89%
Powell 6 5 0 0 11 54.55% 45.45% 100.00%
O'Connor 6 4 3 4 17 52.94% 47.06% 58.82%
Marshall 6 6 3 2 17 52.94% 47.06% 70.59%
Stevens 8 7 1 3 19 47.37% 52.63% 78.95%
Brennan 4 5 2 4 15 40.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Rehnquist 7 9 1 4 21 38.10% 61.90% 76.19%
Scalia 2 5 0 4 11 18.18% 81.82% 63.64%
This table orders the justices from most-to-least likely to vote for
the government in white collar cases. Many strange patterns emerge.
First, the moderate/conservative and moderate justices - Justices
White, Kennedy, Powell, and O'Connor - frequently vote for the
government. Doctrinaire conservative justices Rehnquist and Scalia,
however, are the least likely of all the justices to vote for the
government; Rehnquist is six times, and Justice Scalia eleven times,
more likely to vote for the defendant in a white-collar than in a non-
white collar case.141 Second, the Court's most liberal members -
Justices Marshall and Brennan - vote for the government (in majority
and dissenting opinions) far more often than in the non-white collar
cases; Justice Brennan is two and a half times, and Justice Marshall
140. See id.
141. See Appendix, Table 2.
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seven times more likely to vote for the government in white collar
cases. 42 The variations between the sets of cases are set forth in the
tables below:
Shifts in Liberal/Conservative Voting Patterns143
Liberal Justices
Name % pro G in non-wcc % pro G in wcc Times more likely to vote
pro G in wcc
Marshall 6.90% 52.94% 6.67
Brennan 11.54% 40.00% 2.47
Stevens 32.20% 1 47.37% 0.47
Conservative Justices
Name % pro D in non-wcc % pro D in wcc Times more likely to
vote pro D in wcc
Scalia 6.90% 81.82% 10.86
Rehnquist 8.20% 61.90% 6.10
Powell 21.43% 45.45% 1.12
O'Connor 24.49% 47.06% 0.92
White 24.14% 36.84% 0.53
Burger 20.00% 20.00% 0.00
Further, these cases produce strange alliances among the justices,
where the traditional "liberal" and "conservative" labels seem to lose
their meaning.144 Thus, we will see repeated groupings of justices in
these cases that rarely appear in the non-white collar cases.
B. White Collar Cases
(1) Economic Regulation
Paradigmatic among the Supreme Court's white collar cases are
those arising under criminal statutes that seek to regulate economic
activity. Securities, antitrust, and, to a lesser extent, tax laws meet
this definition. There are few Supreme Court criminal antitrust cases,
however.145 And tax cases do not require the sort of organizational
142. See id.
143. In order to compute these figures, I calculated the difference between the
likelihoods, and then divided by the less likely alternative. For example, in Marshall's
case, I found the difference between his likelihood to vote for the government in non-
white collar cases, and then divided that by the likelihood of voting pro-government in
white collar cases.
144. See infra Part III.B.
145. For one example, see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978).
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setting in which typical white collar crimes arise.
Of the cases included in the sample here, therefore, the securities
cases-and, in particular, the Supreme Court's insider trading cases-
are the most useful. These cases are important in practical terms to
the topic here because they fall within virtually any definition of
"white collar" crime,146 and are considered by some to be the
quintessential example of such crime.147 Although the insider trading
laws and regulations' 48 are highly technical, only a basic overview of
the law in this area is necessary to gain an understanding of the
unusual nature of the Supreme Court's white collar jurisprudence.
(a) Securities Fraud
The Supreme Court has considered four insider trading cases,
and reached a decision in three of them.149 The first case, Chiarella v.
United States, was decided in 1980.150 The decision in Chiarella merits
extended discussion, for it both set forth the doctrinal parameters for
the cases that followed and illustrated the incipient ideological schism
on the Court with regard to the criminal enforcement of the securities
fraud statutes.
In Chiarella, the defendant was employed by a commercial
printing company that prepared soliciting materials for bidders in
tender offer transactions.' 5 ' Knowing that his conduct was prohibited
by his employer's policies, the defendant discerned the "codes" for
146. Under the socio-economic definition, the cases qualify because the defendants are
engaged in "professional" activities (albeit sometimes at lower levels, see Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)); under the conduct-focused definition, the cases
qualify because deception or "fraud" is an inherent part of the crime; and under a
pragmatic approach the cases qualify because they involve a highly specialized area of the
law where initial investigations are generally initiated by a specialized agency, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and do not involve the use of force against persons
or property. See supra at note 30.
147. See David Weisburd, Stanton Wheeler, Elin Waring, & Nancy Bode, CRIMES OF
THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1991).
148. See Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1979).
149. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United
States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
150. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. The printing company employed Chiarella as a "mark-up
man." He was in charge of receiving the manuscripts from the customers and then
selecting the type fonts and layouts. After this was done, Chiarella passed the manuscript
on to the next department to be set into type. 588 F. 2d. 1358,1362-63 (2d Cir. 1978).
151. A "tender offer" is "[A] public announcement by a company or individual
indicating that it will pay a price above the current market price for the shares 'tendered'
of a company it wishes to acquire or take control of." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1468
(6th ed. 1990). Tender offers are one of several types of corporate takeover techniques,
and are regulated by state and federal securities laws.
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the companies involved in five such transactions, bought stock in the
target companies before the bids were made public, and sold
afterwards.15 2 Chiarella made a profit of over $30,000 over fourteen
months.153
At trial, Chiarella was convicted of securities fraud based on the
theory that anyone who receives secret, material information relating
to the purchase or sale of a security is under a duty either to disclose
that information or refrain from trading on it. On appeal, Chiarella
argued that there could be no fraud absent a duty running from the
purchaser of stock (Chiarella) to the sellers (owners of the target
companies' stocks). In examining this issue, the Supreme Court first
found that neither the language of the statute nor the legislative
history indicated whether a duty is required.154 Turning to earlier
insider trading cases and to the common law definition of fraud, the
Court held that
a purchaser of stock who has no duty to a prospective seller
because he is neither an insider nor a fiduciary has... no obligation
to reveal material facts .... 155 No duty could arise from
(defendant's) relationship with the sellers of the target company's
securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was
not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom
the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a
complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions.156
Thus, the majority voted to reverse Chiarella's conviction. The
opinion was written by Justice Powell, who was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, White, Stewart, and Stevens. Justice Brennan concurred
in the result only, allying himself with the dissent in setting forth a
broader theory of liability than the majority adopted.157
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the conviction could
stand on the broader, "misappropriation" theory; because the
defendant had breached a duty to his employer (and also, arguably, to
his employer's clients, as their agent) by misappropriating the
information, he could be convicted of securities fraud.158 Under this
theory, the fraud is not upon a market participant (a buyer or seller of
152. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id. at 229.
156. Id. at 232-33.
157. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens also agreed with the dissent that this
broader theory of liability-not charged by the government in Chiarella-could have
provided a basis for liability. Id. 237-38.
158. Id. at 243-44.
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the securities), but upon someone (an employer or other principal)159
to whom the defendant owed a duty.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented
separately. Justice Blackmun indicated his general agreement with
the Chief Justice's views, but also opined that Chiarella's conviction
could stand even without reliance on the misappropriation theory
because the defendant had "access to confidential information that
the honest investor.., could not legally obtain."'16 The philosophical
thrust of Justices Blackmun and Marshall-that the Court had
inappropriately hampered effective law enforcement by an overly-
narrow interpretation of the securities laws-is resonant of the pro-
government, non-white collar decisions discussed above:
The Court continues to pursue a course... designed to transform §
10(b) from an intentionally elastic 'catchall' provision to one that
catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes
investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated
investor. Such confinement in this case is now achieved by
imposition of a requirement of a 'special relationship' akin to
fiduciary duty before the statute gives rise to a duty to disclose or to
abstain from trading upon material, nonpublic information. The
court admits that this conclusion finds no mandate in the language
of the statute or its legislative history .... 161
This split in the Court continued with its next insider trading
case, Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission.162 In Dirks, the
defendant was an investment analyst who was informed by a
company's former employee that the company had engaged in
fraud.1 63 The employee's purpose was to enlist Dirks' aid in exposing
the fraud.164 Dirks advised his clients to sell their stock in the
company, and later helped expose the fraud.165 Dirks did not
personally own or trade in the securities.166
In a civil enforcement action, the SEC found that, where one
knowingly receives material, nonpublic information, that person has a
duty to disclose the information to the public or refrain from trading.
Thus, because Dirks had disclosed the information to seller-clients
without first disclosing it to the public, he had violated Section
159. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v.
Willis, 778 F. Supp 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
160. 445 U.S. at 247.
161. Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added).
162. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Although a civil enforcement action rather than a criminal
case, Dirks governs the law in criminal 10(b)(5) actions as well as in civil cases.
163. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648-49.
164. See id. at 649.
165. See id
166. See id.
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10(b).167
In reversing and holding Dirks not liable, the Supreme Court
focused on Dirks' status as the tippee of information received from a
corporate insider. 68 The Court again rejected the view that equal
information is required among all traders of the security at issue.
Instead, the Court determined that one who learns inside information
(a "tippee") can assume the tipper's duty only in limited
circumstances-where the tipper/insider stands to gain personally
from divulging the information. 69 Because the insider in Dirks was a
whistle-blower who did not stand to gain financially, Dirks could not
be liable as a tippee170 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion,
and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
White, O'Connor, and Stevens.
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. The dissent, as it had in Chiarella, again scored the
majority for adopting an unduly restrictive interpretation of the
securities laws:
The Court today takes still another step to limit the protections
provided investors by § 10(b) .... The improper purpose
requirement not only has no basis in law, but it rests implicitly on a
policy that I cannot accept. The Court justifies [the insider's] and
Dirks' action because the general benefit derived from the violation
of the [the insider's] duty to shareholders outweighed the harm
caused to those shareholders .... As a citizen, Dirks had at least
an ethical obligation to report the information to the proper
authorities .... The Court's holding is deficient in policy terms not
because it fails to create a legal norm out of that ethical norm....
but because it actually rewards Dirks for his aiding and
abetting .... 171
In 1987, the misappropriation issue, discussed but not decided in
Chiarella, was squarely presented to the Court in United States v.
Carpenter.172 The defendant in Carpenter was a Wall Street Journal
reporter who had traded on and profited from information he had
gathered for publication in the newspaper. The Second Circuit
167. See id. at 650-51 ("Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-
come into possession of material 'corporate information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose
that information or refrain from trading.").
168. See id. at 655-56.
169. See id. at 662-63 ("It is important in this type of case to focus on policing insiders
and what they do... rather than on policing information per se and its possession...
170. See id. at 667.
171. Id. at 667-68 (emphasis added).
172. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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affirmed the conviction under the misappropriation theory,173 but the
Supreme Court split four-to-four on the issue.174 Justice Powell wrote
a draft dissent from an initial denial of certiorari, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist; the Court later voted to grant certiorari,
and Justice Powell retired before a decision in the case was
reached. 175 Based upon these votes and the votes in ChiarellaI76 and
Dirks177 (though not the votes to come in O'Hagan78), it appears that
Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-the key liberal
bloc at this point on the Court-voted to affirm the conviction, and
Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and O'Connor voted to reverse.179
One commentator has concluded that, had Justice Powell remained
on the Court, it would have rejected the misappropriation theory in
Carpenter.180
The Court revisited the misappropriation issue ten years later in
United States v. O'Hagan.181 In the years since the Court evenly
divided on this issue in Carpenter, Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
White, and Blackmun had been replaced by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, respectively. In O'Hagan, the
Court voted six-to-three to affirm the conviction under the
misappropriation theory.182 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the six-
member majority; Justice Scalia wrote an opinion dissenting from this
holding, as did Justice Thomas, who was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
173. 484 U.S. at 21.
174. 484 U.S. 24.
175. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's
Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13,16,34 (1998).
176. See supra note 149.
177. See supra note 163.
178. See infra note 181 (Justice O'Connor voted to sustain the misappropriation theory
in O'Hagan).
179. See Pritchard, supra note 175, at 16. The Carpenter opinion simply states that
"[tihe Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the securities laws and
for that reason affirms the judgment below on those counts," without identifying how the
particular justices voted. 484 U.S. 24. The Court also unanimously affirmed the
defendants' mail fraud convictions. Id.
180. See id.
181. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). The defendant in O'Hagan was an attorney who bought
stock in a corporation that was the target of a bid by a company represented by the
defendant's law firm. Because the defendant was not in a fiduciary relationship with the
company whose stock was traded, he could only be charged under the misappropriation
theory.
182. The other two issues in the case involved whether the SEC exceeded its rule-
making authority and O'Hagan's other arguments attacking the mail fraud convictions on
alternate grounds. The Court ruled the SEC did not exceed its rule-making authority, did
not address O'Hagan's other arguments, and remanded to the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 2206,
2220.
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The anti-government, pro-defense thrust of the O'Hagan
dissents-by the Court's three most conservative members-is
startling. In his opinion, Justice Scalia made the standard argument
against a broad reading of a criminal statute-that such a reading
conflicts with the principle of lenity, which requires that an
ambiguous criminal statute be read in favor of the defendant.' 3 And
Justices Thomas and Rehnquist went further, finding that, on policy
grounds, the parameters of the judicially-defined misappropriation
rule render it so vague as to be neither "coherent [nor] consistent" as
a theory of criminal liability.184 The latter is a basis that these
particular justices rarely use to argue that a non white-collar criminal
conviction should be overturned.185
(b) Tax Fraud
Another essentially economic offense, criminal tax fraud, has
also come before the Court in recent years. Tax crimes can run the
gamut from cases against individuals for allegedly failing to report
income186 to cases against organizations for allegedly filing a false
return in a securities fraud scheme.187 The Supreme Court considered
criminal tax fraud in the former circumstance in United States v.
Cheek. 8' In Cheek, the defendant failed to file tax returns and to
report income based upon his asserted beliefs that the government
had misinterpreted the tax code and that the income tax itself was
unconstitutional. The defendant was convicted of charges that he
willfully evaded taxes189 and willfully failed to file returns. 190 The
issue before the Court was whether an honest, but unreasonable,
belief is a defense to the willfulness elements of these crimes.
In an opinion by Justice White, the Court reversed the
convictions. Specifically, the Court held that the general rule that
"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense" does not
apply to the tax laws. Thus, "willfulness" in the tax crime context
183. 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. I- at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57
(1998). Note that the conservatives invoked the doctrine of lenity in O'Hagan, even
though, as Professor Solan observes, "[t]ypically, conservative courts will exercise their
discretion to construe concepts in criminal statutes broadly, while more liberal courts will
be more generous to defendants," ad at 121, and O'Hagan involves "a classic case of
statutory vagueness," id. at 117.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Cheek, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
187. United States v. Princeton-Newport, 858 F. 2d 115 (2d Cir 1988); United States v.
Regan, 713 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
188. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
189. 28 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
190. 28 U.S.C.A. § 7203 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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does allow for a defense of mistaken reading of the law because "[t]he
proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of
the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws."' 91 Justices
Rehnquist, Kennedy, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in the majority,
while Justice Scalia concurred. 192 Justice Blackmun dissented, in an
opinion joined by Justice Marshall. The dissent was incredulous that
the Court would allow an honest but unreasonable belief as to
whether "wages" are "income" to be put to the jury as a defense: "[I]t
is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after
the institution of our present federal income tax system.., any
taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges
of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for
his labor is not income .... ,193
The opinions in the securities and tax areas thus affirm certain
common themes; in these cases, the liberals are generally loath to
read a statute so as to benefit the defendant, while the conservatives
take the opposite tack. The question arises whether these themes are
unique to issues of economically-focused statutory schemes, where
conservatives might be expected to vote to limit the state's powers, or
extend to other types of white collar crimes.
(2) Public Corruption
Although not necessarily related to business, public corruption
cases are generally thought to fall under the rubric of "white collar
crime,"'1 94 and certainly fall within the general definition of the term
set forth in Part I above. Alleged corruption of public officials is
prosecuted federally under a number of statutes.195 Although such
191. 498 U.S. 192,199-200. The Court held that a good faith belief in the interpretation
of the laws is a defense, but not a good faith belief in the law's constitutionality. 498 U.S.
192,206. Justice Scalia challenged this distinction in his concurring opinion. 498 U. S. 192,
207.
192. Justice Souter did not participate. 498 U.S. 192,207.
193. 498 U.S. 192,209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Cheek decision, needless to say,
is controversial. See Dwight W. Stone, Cheek v. United States: A Precise Definition of the
Willfulness Requirement in Federal Tax Crimes, 51 MD. L. REv. 224 (1992); Mark D.
Yochum, Cheek is Chic: Ignorance of the Law is an Excuse for Tax Crimes-A Fashion
That Does Not Wear Well, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 249 (1993); and Mark C. Winnings, Ignorance
is Bliss, Especially for the Tax Evader, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1993).
194. See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 34, at 363-416; Israel, Podgor, Borman, supra note 20,
at 30-36; Bucy, supra note 20, at 274-320.
195. On federal prosecution of state and local corruption, see Sara Sun Beale, Too
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS LI. 979 (1995); Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the
Prosecution of Local Political Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. REv. 321 (1983).
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cases have involved a myriad of charges, including RICO,196 money
laundering, 197 tax fraud,198 and mail fraud,199 this section focuses on
two offenses directed to public corruption: extortion,2° and bribery.201
Once again, strange voting patterns, both by individual justices and by
blocs of justices, are immediately apparent.
The federal bribery statute criminalizes the giving of a bribe to,
or the receipt of a bribe by, a "public official," defined to include
members of Congress, government officers and employees, jurors,
and anyone "acting for or on behalf of" the federal government "in
any official function, under or by authority of" a federal agency or
department.2°2 The United States Supreme Court has seldom
considered the interpretation of this statute; one significant case was
Dixson v. United States,203 decided in 1984. The issue in Dixson was
whether officers of a private, non-profit corporation administering
and expending federal block grants are "public officials" under this
statute.2°4 The Dixson defendants were not federal employees, and
were several steps removed from the federal agency that gave the
grants.205
In a five-to-four decision, the Court determined that the
defendants fell within the statute. Justice Marshall wrote the pro-
government opinion, and was joined by rare bedfellows Justices
Burger, Powell, and White, and by sometimes-bedfellow Justice
Blackmun. 2°6 Justice O'Connor wrote the dissent, which was joined
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 & 1962.
197. E.g., United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1991) (18 U.S.C. § 981).
198. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) & 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
200. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951(West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
201. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
202. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 1989).
203. 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
204. See id at 484.
205. Dixson was Executive Director of United Neighborhoods, Inc. (UNI), a
community- based, social service organization set up by the City of Peoria. UNI was in
charge of the administration of federal block grants in the amounts of $400,000 and $636,
000. The grants were funded through the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974. Petitioner Dixson and Petitioner Hinton, Housing Rehabilitation Coordinator, were
indicted by a federal grand jury in an 11-count indictment. The indictment charged
petitioners as "public officials" under 18 U.S.C. § 201(a). The indictment charged
petitioners with taking a series of bribes in return for "being influenced... in awarding of
housing contracts." Id. at 484-85.
206. The majority framed the issue as whether the defendants "occupie[d] a position of
public trust with official federal responsibilities." Id. at 496. The Court answered in the
affirmative: "[T]hese officials hold precisely the sort of positions of national public trust
that Congress intended to cover with the 'acting for or on behalf of' language in the
bribery statute. The Federal Government has a strong and legitimate interest in
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by Justices Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens, an odd criminal dissent
alignment indeed. The dissent found that the majority's broad
reading of the statute was justified neither by the statute's language
nor by Congressional intentYz 7
Unlike the federal bribery statutes, the federal extortion
provisions of the Hobbs Act have the potential to reach purely state
and local officials. The Hobbs Act, and the cases brought under it,
raise complex issues,208 but an overview of two recent Supreme Court
will suffice to show voting patterns in this area. In 1991, the Supreme
Court in McConnick v. United States2°9 considered the appeal of a
state elected official who had been convicted of extortion in
connection with the receipt of a campaign contribution. The Court
reversed the conviction, holding that an element of such an offense is
that the contribution have been made in exchange for a quid pro
quo.210 Justice White wrote the majority opinion, and focused on the
policy implications of a broad reading of the statute, which would
"open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to
be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is
unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private
contributions or expenditures .... "211 Justices Stevens, Blackmun,
and O'Connor dissented.212
One year later, in Evans v. United States,21 3 the Court considered
whether a public official must affirmatively induce the allegedly
extorted party to give the official something of value, or whether the
elements of extortion can be proven even where the extorted party
prosecuting petitioners for their misuse of Government funds." IL at 500-01.
207. Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 criminalizes, inter alia, "extortion," defined as "the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." As noted above, supra note 40,
the use of physical force and threats removes this offense from the realm of white collar
crime. In most cases, "white collar" extortion will involve extortion "under color of
official right," as when a public official uses his or her position to demand payment.
Extortion by fear, however, can also include fear of economic harm, and some white collar
prosecutions have included this theory. See, e..g., United States v. Garcia, 992 F. 2d 409
(2d Cir. 1993). See Martin B. Goldberg, White-Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law,
Extortion, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 547 (187); James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 815 (1998); and Thomas A. Secrest, Criminal Law: Bribery Equal Extortion: The
Supreme Court Refuses to Make Inducement a Necessary Element of Extortion "Under
Color of Official Right" under the Hobbs Ac4 § 18 U.S.C. 1951: Evans v. United States, 19
U. DAYTON L. REV. 251 (1993).
209. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
210. Id. at 265.
211. Id. at 272.
212. Id. at 280.
213. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
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initiated the transaction. 214 The Court affirmed the conviction,
finding that an affirmative act of inducement is not required. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the common law of
extortion and upon the statute's plain language.
215
Since Evans was decided, commentators have struggled to make
sense of the federal law of extortion given the potential disharmony
between Evans and McCormick.2 6 For our purposes, the votes are
intriguing, and perhaps explain the apparent disjunction between the
cases. Justice Stevens, who dissented from the pro-defendant holding
in McCormick, wrote the pro-government majority opinion in Evans,
and was joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and White. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy filed limited concurrences.
Justice Thomas dissented in an opinion quoted at the beginning
of this article. That he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia-together the triumvirate of the most consistently
conservative, pro-government justices on the Court 217 - surely sends
some sort of message, though exactly what is not clear. Justice
Thomas' rhetoric is startling, given its source. After criticizing the
majority's reading of the common law, Justice Thomas then attacks
the decision as "repugnant... to the basic tenets of criminal justice
reflected in the rule of lenity. '218 In Justice Thomas' view, lenity rests
upon two considerations. First, if a defendant is to be given fair
notice, then the definition of the crime should be clear. Second and
perhaps more significant, as we shall see, Justice Thomas wrote,
"because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of
the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity."219
Justice Thomas next characterized the majority opinion as
violative of principles of federalism. He then turned to the theme
214. Id. at 257. The Evans defendant was a county commissioner who had been
ensnared by an FBI sting operation targeting local corruption.
215. Id. at 258.
216. See, e.g., Steven C. Yarbrough, The Hobbs Act in the Nineties: Confusion or
Clarification of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Public Corruption Prosecutions under
the Hobbs Act, 31 TULSA L.J. 781 (1996).
217. See Harvard Law Review Association, Supreme Court: 1996 Term Leading Cases,
111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 434; Harvard Law Review Association, Supreme Court: 1995
Term Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REv. 135, 370; Harvard Law Review Association,
Supreme Court: 1994 Term Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 343; Harvard Law
Review Association, Supreme Court: 1993 Term Leading Cases, 108 HARv. L. REv. 139,
375.
218. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,289 (1992) (Thomas, J. dissenting). This rule
requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be read in favor of the defendant. Id. at 290.
219. Id. at 289 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971))(emphasis
added).
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that produced his most dramatic attack on the majority-the potential
for prosecutorial overreaching: "All Americans, including public
officials, are entitled to protection from prosecutorial abuse. The
facts of this case suggest a depressing erosion of that protection."220
The dissent ends with the specter of doors opening to "prosecutorial
abuse."22'
(3) Cross-over crimes
Unlike economic and public corruption crimes, many "white
collar crimes" involve charges under statutes that do not describe a
particular type of offense. In particular, the mail/wire fraud
statutesm and the RICO statute,2-3 as with the federal conspiracy
statute, provide prosecutors with avenues for additional criminal
charges in the context of a white collar scheme involving other,
substantive charges 24 (although some mail/wire fraud cases stand on
their own 25). Other statutes, such as the false statements statute 2 6
and the financial transaction reporting statutes,22 7 may be used on
their own, or may be charged in conjunction with other offenses 22
The voting patterns in cases involving all these areas follow the
patterns I described above.
In two important mail fraud cases, the Court considered whether
the mailing was in furtherance of the fraud, the use of the mails
providing the jurisdictional element of the crime.229 In both cases, the
substantive charge was the fraud. In United States v. Maze, the five-
member majority voted to reverse the conviction, finding that the
mailings were not "for the purpose of executing" the fraud.230 Justice
Rehnquist wrote the pro-defendant opinion; Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, along with Justices Burger and White, voted to affirm the
220. 504 U.S. 255,295 (citing Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654,727-732 (1988)).
221. d (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727-732).
222. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341 & 1343 (1997).
223. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (1997).
224. For example, many of the criminal securities fraud cases also included mail/wire
fraud charges. E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
225. E.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); Schmuck v. United States, 489
U.S. 705 (1989).
226. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
227. See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5311-5325 (West 1989 & Supp 1998).
228. See, e.g, United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985).
229. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705
(1989).
230. 414 U.S. at 402. The defendant had used a stolen credit card to pay for travel
expenses. The government's theory was that the vendors' mailing of receipts to the issuing
bank, and the bank's mailing of the bills to the card's owner, were for the purpose of
carrying out the fraudulent use of the card.
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conviction. Fifteen years later, a similar issue came before the Court
in Schmuck v. United States.231 Once again, the Court split five-to-
four on whether the mailings were in furtherance of the fraud, this
time sustaining the conviction. Justice Blackmun wrote the pro-
government majority opinion. Justice Scalia wrote the pro-defendant
dissent, advocating a narrow construction of the statute: "[I]t is mail
fraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs iability .... The mailing must be
in furtherance of the fraud.' '232 Justices O'Connor, Brennan, and
Marshall joined the dissent.
The Supreme Court considered another element of mail fraud in
McNally v. United States.233 The defendants were a state official and
private individual who allegedly engaged in a self-dealing patronage
scheme. The government's theory was that the scheme, which
involved the use of the mails, defrauded the state's citizens and their
government of their right to the good and honest services of state
officials. In reversing the convictions, the Court overturned all the
federal courts of appeals that had considered the issue. The Court
held that deprivation of money or property is an element of mail
fraud, and that no such deprivation was alleged in the case before it.
Justice Stevens wrote the pro-government dissent, arguing that the
majority's decision deprived the federal government of a powerful
anti-corruption tool.24
The strange voting patterns extend to other areas as well. In
Ratzlaf v. United States,235 the Court reversed the conviction of a
defendant who paid off a gambling debt in cash transactions
"structured" to avoid currency reporting requirements. In a five-to-
four decision, the Court held that an element of the crime was proof
that the defendant "knew the structuring he undertook was
unlawful," that is, a specific intent to violate the law.236 Justices Scalia
and Kennedy joined in Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion, along
with Justices Souter and Stevens. Justice Blackmun wrote the pro-
231. 489 U.S. 705 (1989). The defendant was a used-car distributor who rolled back
odometers on the cars he sold to dealers; the government's theory was that the mailing
element was satisfied by the dealers' mailing of title application forms on behalf of
purchasers.
232. 489 U.S. 705.
233. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
234. 483 U.S. 350, 361. Justice O'Connor joined in the dissent. That same year, in
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court unanimously held that the
"money or property" requirement is met when an employee steals confidential
information from his employer, in breach of a fiduciary duty. As noted supra at 172, the
Court split evenly on the defendant's securities fraud conviction.
235. 510 U.S. 135 (1994). Money laundering and financial reporting statutes are often
the basis for charges in drug- and/or organized crime-related cases, but can of course apply
in white collar cases. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 1956.
236. Id. at 658.
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government dissent, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The required mental state was again at issue in United States v.
Yermian,237 a false statement prosecution. In that case, the appeals
court had reversed the conviction on the ground that the government
was required to prove that the defendant had acted with actual
knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.3 8 In yet another five-to-
four decision, the Court found that the appeals court had
misinterpreted the statute, and reinstated the conviction.239 Justice
Powell wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and White. Justice Rehnquist wrote the
pro-defendant dissent, accusing the majority of having violated the
rule of lenity and criticizing the "unfairness" of the result.24 Justices
O'Connor, Brennan, and Stevens joined in the dissent.
(4) Procedural Issues
The Supreme Court has not decided many cases where
procedural issues-those not based on substantive violations of the
law-were raised that were unique to white collar crimes. 241 In two
important such cases, however, the Court split in ways that mirror the
splits in the "substantive" white collar cases. Although the sample is
small, these cases are potentially significant for this article because
they test whether the substance/procedure dichotomy discussed
above242 may be a key variable in the white collar/non-white collar
voting disparities. These cases arise in areas generally considered to
be part of the "law" of white collar investigations and prosecutions-
the courts' supervisory powers over grand juries, and the Fifth
Amendment as applied in the corporate context.243
In the grand jury context, the most significant recent case in
which there was substantial disagreement on the Court produced
another five-to-four decision. In United States v. Williams,244 the
defendant was charged with making materially false statements to
banks to influence their actions.245 After he was indicted, Williams
237. 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
238. 741 F. 2d. 267 (9th Cir. 1984).
239. 468 U.S. at 75.
240. Id. at 83. Again, the false statement statute can apply in white collar or non-white
collar cases.
241. Furthermore, as noted supra Part I.C., standard procedural issues, such as those
arising under the Fourth Amendment, rarely arise in white collar cases. See Henning,
supra note 19, at 408 n. 18.
242. See supra at Part I.C.
243. See Bucy at 418-93; Israel, Podgor, & Borman at 292-715; First at 382-622.
244. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
245. See id. at 38; case was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
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moved to dismiss on the ground that the prosecutor had failed to
present "substantial exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury. The
district court agreed with Williams, finding that the prosecutor's
failure warranted remedy under the courts' "supervisory power," and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.246 The Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Souter.
The majority found that grand juries operate with independence, and
are not subject to strict court supervision.247 Nor, according to the
majority, would requiring disclosure of exculpatory materials comport
with the historical background of grand juries.' 48
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, which focused on the dangers
of prosecutorial misconduct. In particular, the dissent argued that
courts have power to supervise grand juries so as to remedy
misconduct.249  Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Thomas-yet another strange lineup.
Especially significant is Justice Thomas' vote, a rare split at that point
in his tenure from Justice Scalia2 0 Based upon his dissenting opinion
in Evans v. United States,251 quoted at the beginning of this paper, it is
apparent that the theme of prosecutorial misconduct resonates with
Justice Thomas in the white collar crime context. Why that might be
so is explored more fully in the next section.
In the corporate Fifth Amendment context, the Court in
Braswell v. United States5 once again split five-to-four along strange
lines. The majority found that a corporate custodian of records may
not rely upon the Fifth Amendment and decline to respond to a
subpoena for those records, even if production would be personally
incriminating. The Court relied upon the established rule that
corporations do not have a Fifth Amendment privilege. The Court
also noted that "recognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf
of the records custodians of collective entities would have a
detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-
collar crime,' one of the most serious problems confronting law
enforcement authorities.'- 53 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was
246. See id. at 45.
247. See id. at 47-50.
248. See id. at 51-55.
249. See id. at 55-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. See Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The
Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 594-96, 610-12
(1995); Christopher E. Smith & S. Thomas Read, The Performance and Effectiveness of
New Appointees to the Rehnquist Court, 20 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 205,213-14,220-21 (1993).
251. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). See supra note 213.
252. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
253. Id. at 115.
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joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice
Kennedy's dissent concluded that the majority's holding "avoided and
manipulated" core Fifth Amendment principlesz 4 The dissent was
joined by Justices Scalia, Marshall, and Brennan, a line-up rarely
otherwise seen in Supreme Court Fifth Amendment cases.25
C. Common Patterns in White Collar Cases
Across a range of substantive and procedural white collar issues,
conservative and liberal justices abandon their usual pro-government
and pro-dissent positions. The common "Rehnquist Court"
conservative majority, apparent across the spectrum of non-white
collar cases discussed in Part H, has been widely deemed to be "pro-
government" and "anti-defendant." As one commentator has noted,
"Whereas the opinions of the Warren Court are often described as
'pro-defendant,' the opinions of the Rehnquist Court can be
characterized as 'pro-state' or 'anti-defendant."' Z 6 Except in white
collar cases, we should add. Major white collar decisions involving
securities fraud, tax fraud, bribery, extortion, financial crimes, and
procedure evince either a complete reversal of the usual Rehnquist
Court majorities' approaches to criminal cases, or, at a minimum, the
dissolution of those blocs and their reconstitution in unexpected
forms. The next section addresses the possible reasons for this white
collar paradox.
IV. An Analysis of White Collar Judicial Politics
It is hard to dispute that the Supreme Court justices in white
collar cases act in ways that appear to be, at a minimum, inconsistent
with those justices' general criminal justice philosophies. The
question, then, is whether we can identify variables that determine
the justices' conceptions of issues in these cases-variables, not
deducible from the cases' rhetoric alone, that drive the voting.
Professor Kelman has noted that "legal argument has two phases,
interpretive construction and rational rhetoricism, and that the
former, a vital step which undercuts the rationality of the latter, goes
virtually unexamined."5 7 In this view, a judge must first translate
254. Id at 120 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
255. For more typical dissenting line-ups in Fifth Amendment cases, see Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 305 (1980) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented from
a decision that the defendant had not been "interrogated" for Miranda purposes), and
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 377 (1979) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens dissented from a decision declining to require an express waiver under Miranda).
256. Harcourt, supra note 78, at 1221.
257. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 591,591-92 (1981).
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real-world controversy into substantive legal controversy
("interpretive construction"). It is the process of framing and
contextualizing the controversy that goes unexamined; the usual focus
is instead on the language of the opinion, which expresses the
supposedly rational analysis ("rational rhetoricism") by which the
judge reaches the legal conclusion25 8 I believe it is fair to say that the
Supreme Court's white collar crime cases are a prime example of
unexamined "interpretive construction."
In this section, I use the cases discussed in the last two sections to
examine the unarticulated determinants of the white collar case
voting patterns. First, I ask whether the white collar paradox can
fairly be said to be attributable to class bias-the "common"
perception of the Court's white collar jurisprudence that extends back
to Sutherland's original focus. Because I believe that this
"traditional" explanation for the inconsistency does not survive close
scrutiny, I next explore other explanations for the justices' apparent
inconsistencies. For example, it could be that the types of issues
usually raised in the white collar cases (statutory rather than
constitutional, substantive rather than procedural), rather than the
white collar context itself, determine the voting. Or, it may simply be
that conservative justices seek to reign in big federal government,
especially in areas involving economic regulation and/or federal
intrusion into areas of traditional state responsibility. Finally, I
explore whether the paradox might rather be due to the justices'
views of the very process of criminalization, as applied in the white
collar context. Because I believe that the latter is the case, I conclude
with a call for a more direct, and less hypocritical, approach to issues
of white collar criminalization.
A. Socio-Economic/Class/Race-Based Decision-Making
An overview of the cases discussed in Parts II and I above does
reveal the basis for the common impression that the defendants'
socio-economic status influences the Supreme Court justices' criminal
case votes. As noted above,259 at a minimum the perception is that
white collar crime is crime of the upper-middle and upper-classes,
while other kinds of crime are committed primarily by lower-status
defendants. To again borrow Professor Kelman's language, in this
light the justices' votes in white collar cases can be seen as the product
of "result determinism;" that is, these votes "correspond to the
political program of a social group, and the interpretive construction
may simply serve to cover up the result-oriented, overtly political
258. Id.
259. See supra note 24.
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nature of resolving disputes. ' 12 60 Conservative justices' politics is
rooted in their obeisance to the dominant socio- economic class, the
argument would go, while liberal justices' politics is that of oppressed
social and racial groups. Because of these political orientations, the
justices' criminal law ideologies metamorphose in the land of white
collar crime. This section tests that argument.
(1) Imagery and Bias in Non-White Collar Crime Cases
For Warren-Court era justices Brennan and Marshall, and their
sometimes Burger/Rehnquist-Court allies Justices Stevens and
Blackmun, there does appear, in the non-white collar context, to be
an implicit and even explicit class (and race) bias.261 As noted above,
in the non-white collar context, the pro-defense dissents often
emphasize that the Court's pro-government decisions disfavor the
uneducated,262 the poor and urban,263 and the non-white.264 Class and
race issues are rarely, if ever, raised explicitly in the Court's white
collar cases; nonetheless, the perception is that most white collar
defendants do not fall into the groups that the liberal-dissenters seek
to protect in the non-white collar cases. 265
A race/class-based explanation of criminal case voting patterns
has been proffered by a number of commentators. One study of the
Warren Court's criminal cases, for example, concluded that those
cases "project a consistent image of the defendant as an
impressionable and vulnerable young adult, poor and uneducated, in
need of protection from an overbearing police force. Special
260. Kelman, supra note 257, at 670 (emphasis in original).
261. One commentator noted that "Justice Marshall voted very consistently in favor of
defendants.... Yet he occasionally made exceptions, usually when the defendant was
accused of a white collar crime.... [T]o Justice Marshall, the distinction between violent
crime and white collar crime may have appeared quite consistent with his own ideological
system." Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States
Supreme Court, 1900-90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 693 (1993). This commentator,
however, does not describe the "ideological system" that produced the voting dichotomy.
Presumably, he was speaking of an ideology focusing on the need to protect members of
lower socio-economic and minority racial groups from abuse of governmental power.
262. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority holding as "confin[ing] the protection of the Fourth Amendment
against searches conducted without probable cause to the sophisticated, the
knowledgeable, and, I might add, the few").
263. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 97 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall) ("Approximately 4.1 million of those [apartment] units
are in central cities or metropolitan areas. Such units are home to a large number of
lower-income families and disproportionate number of minority families.").
264. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 450 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens) (see supra note 102).
265. See supra at Part III. Whether this perception conforms with reality is discussed
infra at Part IV.A.2.
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emphasis is almost always placed on the traits that render the
defendant disadvantaged: poverty, race, lack of education, youth or
mental deficiency. '266 This imagery is consistent throughout the
Warren Court's criminal cases,267 and is used frequently by Warren
Court members Justices Brennan and Marshall in their dissents from
pro-government Burger/Rehnquist Court decisions.
Conversely, conservatives tend to portray defendants in non-
white collar cases as brutish and frightening, not as weak and
sympathetic. 268 The conservatives thus focus on the nature of the
defendants' conduct, and its impact upon victims, rather than upon
the defendants. Consider, for example, Chief Justice Burger's dissent
from the Court's five-to-four decision in Brewer v. Williams,269 in
which the majority reversed a conviction on the ground that a
confession obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had been introduced at trial. Burger's dissent began, "The
result in this case ought to be intolerable in any society which
purports to call itself an organized society.... Williams is guilty of
the savage murder of a small child; no member of this Court contends
he is not."270 Or consider Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent from the
Court's six-to-three decision in Payton v. New York, which required a
search warrant for entry into a home. Rehnquist wrote: "I... cannot
refrain from commenting on the social implications of the result
reached by the Court. Payton was arrested for the murder of the
manager of a gas station; [the other defendant] was arrested for two
266. Harcourt, supra note 78, 1192. Scholars have debated whether it is more likely that
imagery produces ideology, or whether the reverse is true. See id. at 1170-1176, citing
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981); J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197 (1990);
and J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1991). For the purposes
of this paper, this theoretical debate is largely beside the point; rather, assuming that
imagery and ideology correlate-irrespective of which comes first-the question here is
whether class- (and/or race-) based imagery/ideology correlate to the voting in the
Supreme Court's white collar and non-white collar cases.
267. Harcourt, supra note 78, at 1196; for discussions of the effect of race and class in
the Warren Court's criminal justice jurisprudence, see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward
a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L. J. 39, 69, 80
(1991); Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice
Marshall's View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 372 & n. 23 (1994); Michael
J. Kiarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1,
63-66 (1996); Tracey Matlin, Justice Thurgood Marshall Taking the Fourth Amendment
Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 812 (1992); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the
Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2231, 2234
(1993).
268. See Harcourt, supra note 78, at 1199-1204 (discussing images of defendants in
Rehnquist Court opinions).
269. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
270. Id. at 416.
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armed robberies. [S]urely something is amiss in the process of the
administration of justice whereby these convictions are now set aside
by this Court .... "271
Finally, consider the rhetoric in Callins v. Collins,272 in which
Justice Blackmun-shortly before his retirement-announced his
position that the death penalty is unconstitutional. In response,
Justice Scalia wrote:
Justice Blackmun begins his statement by describing with
poignancy the death of a convicted murderer by lethal injection.
He chooses, as the case in which to make that statement, one of the
less brutal of the murders that regularly come before us-the
murder of a man ripped by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly,
with no opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs, and left to
bleed to death on the floor of a tavern. The death-by-injection
which Justice Blackmun describes looks pretty desirable next to
that. It looks even better next to some of the other cases currently
before us...-for example, the case of the 11-year-old girl raped
by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties down her
throat. How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared
with that!273
In all these cases, the conservatives focus upon the crimes' effects
upon society, not upon the need of the criminal justice system to
protect defendants' rights. The difference in rhetoric and imagery
from the liberals' opinions could hardly be clearer.
(2) Imagery and Bias in White Collar Crime Cases
Why the different approaches in the white collar cases? Why do
liberals suddenly seem unconcerned with defendants' rights, while
conservatives suddenly seem unconcerned with crime's effects upon
society? It may be that the "liberals" are simply more philosophically
inclined to hold the relatively wealthy and powerful to the highest
standards in the white collar cases; these may not be the sorts of
people who, the liberals believe, need the Court's protection. It may
also be, as the common wisdom would have it, that the conservatives
identify with the white collar defendant.
There is not much in the way of explicit rhetoric or imagery in
the white collar cases' descriptions of the defendants to support this
conclusion. That imagery does, however, emerge in the sentencing
process, and there invites comparison to the imagery in the non-white
collar cases. In their 1988 study of white collar sentencing, Professor
271. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
272. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
273. Id. at 1141 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (citation omitted).
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Stanton Wheeler and his colleagues interviewed fifty-one federal
judges concerning the white collar sentencing process.274 One factor
in sentencing was the judges' tendency to relate to the white collar
defendant, who they perceived to be of similar socio-economic status
as themselves.275 As one judge said, avoiding bias was difficult
"where people like you are standing in front of you. '276
Commentators likewise have concluded that socio-economic factors
traditionally lead judges to be "soft" on white collar criminals. One
author, for example, examined the treatment of defendants in the
savings and loan scandals, and concluded that "higher-class crooks
are treated leniently. '277
But, if we extrapolate these observations in the sentencing
context to the outcome of Supreme Court cases, why-as the
traditional explanation for the white collar paradox would have it-
do the conservative justices appear to feel this empathy, while the
liberals do not?278 Perhaps it is the justices' political philosophies and
value systems themselves that produce this apparent empathy. On
274. Wheeler, supra note 12. Of course, in the world of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, judges today have far less sentencing discretion than they did at the time of
this study. See KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 740-42
(1995).
275. Wheeler, supra note 12, at 107, 161. See Donald Langevoort, Ego, Human
Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 882 (1995)("The act of judging others often
necessarily involves implicit self-comparison.); Deborah Young, Federal Sentencing:
Looking Back to Move Forward, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 135, 140 (1991)(book review of
Wheeler, et al.)(noting that the interviews "point out the potential bias of judges who
identify with white-collar criminals and not with other criminals").
276. Id. at 161.
277. JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON:
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE vi (1998). Professor Reiman goes on to
conclude, "[T]here is considerable evidence that the American criminal justice system has
been used throughout its history in rather unsubtle ways to protect the interests of the
powerful against the lower classes and political dissenters." Id. at 166. As the Supreme
Court itself noted in upholding the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines,
the guidelines sought to correct the "too lenient" treatment afforded "major white-collar
criminals." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,376 (1989).
278. Certainly, the socio-economic backgrounds of the individual justices do not explain
this disparity, for those backgrounds simply do not correspond to the justices' political
views. Among the liberals, some have come from privileged backgrounds (e.g., Justices
Breyer and Stevens), while others have come from modest backgrounds (e.g., Justices
Brennan, Ginsburg, and Marshall). Some conservatives have likewise come from
privileged backgrounds (e.g., Justices Powell and O'Connor), while others decidedly have
not (e.g., Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Burger). See CLARE CUSHMAN, THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789 - 1995 476-80, 501-04,
531-34 (1995); LEON FRIEDMAN & FRED L. ISRAEL, JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, VOL. 5, 1875-77 (1997);
WILLIAM D. PEDERSON & NORMAN W. PROVIZER, THE GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE STUDIES 281-83 (1993).
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the most obvious level, the argument goes, conservatives identify with
dominant racial and social groups, and are averse to criminalizing
activities primarily associated with these groups.2 79 More subtly, for
the conservative justices, economically successful defendants may
seem to be more morally deserving than other defendants.280
According to one commentator, Justice Scalia's moral view, for
example, leads him to be "deferential toward society's subornation of
its underdogs but not its entrepreneurs." 281  Thus, a conservative
justice might wish to scrutinize carefully society's punishment of a
"successful" defendant with whom that justice identifies.
For the liberals, on the other hand, the white collar defendant is
simply not a member of the group that needs protecting from
overreaching and abusive government practices. Moreover, as
Professor Coffee has written, in response to claims that the typical
white collar statute is unfairly vague and overbroad, "liberals may
claim that the traditionally limited use of the criminal sanction was
class-biased and that a more pervasive use of it simply corrects the
imbalance." Thus, not only do liberals perceive the white collar
defendant as undeserving of the Court's protection, but they may also
see enforcement of white collar criminal statutes as a way to help
correct societal inequities.
(3) Evaluating the Traditional Explanation
I must admit that there is much in the foregoing explanations
that is appealing. It is undeniable that class- and race-based
inequities have existed and continue to exist throughout the criminal
justice process. One sympathetic to efforts to rid the system of bias
might find comfort in placing upon the personal, philosophical biases
of judges the blame for those judges' apparently hypocritical
applications of the criminal law. The class-based explanation,
however, depends upon the validity of Sutherland's understanding of
the nature of white collar crime. As shown above, Sutherland's
definition-which focuses upon the high social status of the
defendant283-comports neither with the class of persons charged
279. See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised
Constitutional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible
Prosecutorial Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1190-91 (1995) ("Many conservatives do
not speak of [white collar crime] because they might have to attack members of their own
socioeconomic class or race").
280. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral Agendas of
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219,235-36 (1996).
281. Id. at 235-36.
282. John C. Coffee, "Does 'Unlawful' Mean 'Criminal'? Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193,220 (1991).
283. See supra Part I.A. & note 20.
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under crimes universally deemed to be "white collar,"'' 4 nor with the
white collar cases the Supreme Court has decided.25
The most comprehensive study to date of white collar criminals
concludes that the typical white collar defendant is not of high socio-
economic status but is decidedly "middle class."' 6 In fact, as one
commentator has noted, even this conclusion exaggerates the typical
white collar defendant's status, for the statistics show that "a lot of
white collar criminals have characteristics that are correlative of
common criminality: They are poor, black, unemployed, male, or
young offenders who are entrepreneurs of non-specialized criminal
careers in large cities." 2 7  And other statistics undercut a socio-
economic-based explanation for the white collar crime voting
disparity. For example, most of the white collar defendants in the
study referenced above were not represented by private attorneys,
and nearly half had prior arrest records-the substantial majority of
those for non-white collar crimes 288 Moreover, several commentators
have noted that higher-status defendants tend to be more likely to be
targeted by prosecutors and, if charged and convicted, more likely to
be sentenced to lengthy prison sentences than lower-status
defendants.289
Of course, it is possible that Supreme Court justices' votes are
affected by the status of the defendants before the Court, not by the
overall sets of defendants who have been charged with that particular
crime. But, as noted in more detail above, many of the "white collar"
defendants in the cases the Court has decided simply do not fall
within any definition of "high status." 29° An analysis of the cases thus
does not support the class/race-based explanation of the white collar
crime voting disparities. Nor do the demographics of these
defendants support this conclusion.
B. Issue Definitions and the "Substance" of Statutory Construction
One explanation for the voting disparities is that they are the
product of the types of narrow legal issues raised in the two sets of
cases. Perhaps the types of issues commonly raised in white collar
cases-rather than the characteristics of the white collar defendant-
therefore drive the voting patterns. For example, as discussed in Part
284. See supra Part I.A.
285. See supra Part III.
286. See Weisburd, supra note 29.
287. John Braithwaite, Crime and the Average American, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 215,
221 (1993).
288. Weisburd, supra note 29, at 67.
289. Id. at 143; Braithwaite, supra note 286, at 218.
290. See supra Part III.
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291 issues of statutory construction, including due process issues of
vagueness and overbreadth, predominate in the white collar cases,
perhaps reflecting a legislative tendency to overcriminalize in the
area. On the other hand, non-white collar cases rarely turn on these
issues, but focus on "procedural" issues. This section analyzes
whether it is the type of specific issues common to the two sets of
cases that drive the voting patterns.
(1) White Collar Crime and the "Substance" of Statutory Construction
In a broad array of areas, the Court has considered the
construction of white collar criminal statutes. In each of these areas,
we have seen both individual justices voting in ways that appear
inconsistent with their individual criminal justice philosophies and
alignments of justices rarely seen in non-white collar criminal cases.
This pattern holds whether the issue involves invoking the doctrine of
lenity in construing ambiguous statutes292 or analyzing common law
or Congressional intent.293
Often, the very nature of criminalizing white collar activities
appears to invite these issues. In this area, Congress routinely enacts
statutes the terms of which are vague and the application of which is
subject to inconsistent and potentially unfair interpretation.294 There
are at least two possible reasons for this. First, activities that are
primarily economic in nature are necessarily hard to define; as
Sanford Kadish has observed, it is difficult for a criminal statute
clearly to distinguish illegal behavior and "acceptable aggressive
business behavior. 295 Certainly this has been true in the Court's
291. See id.
292. This is true, for example, in the securities fraud cases discussed supra at notes 151-
84 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (common law of fraud); Evans, 564 U.S. 255
(Congressional intent).
294. See Podgor, supra note 19, at 398-400 (discussing RICO and mail fraud statutes as
examples of vague white collar criminal statutes). As Professor Podgor notes, Justice
Scalia himself made this point in connection with the Court's definition of the RICO
pattern requirement as "continuity plus relationship." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone, 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). Scalia, noting that the pattern requirement applies to
both civil and criminal RICO cases, id. at 250-55 (Scalia, J., concurring), deemed the
Court's definition to be "about as helpful [for lower courts] as 'life is a fountain."' Id. at
251.
295. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 423, 425 (1963). A number of
scholars have criticized Kadish's view of the criminalization of white collar activities. See,
e.g., Coffee, supra note 281, at 236 (questioning Kadish's assumptions about public
attitudes towards the criminalization of economic activities); Harry V. Ball and Lawrence
M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation:
A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197. 200-96 (1965) (questioning Kadish's
categorizations of the types of economic crimes and his conclusions that only some types
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attempts to define insider trading.296 And this difficulty extends
beyond the purely economic arena. As noted above, for example, the
Court has found it hard to distinguish legitimate from extortionate
demands for campaign contributions, 297 and mail and fraud from mail
fraud.298
Second, as Professor Stuntz has argued, it may be that the
constraints the courts have placed on law enforcement in the criminal
procedure context have led Congress to expand the scope of white
collar criminal statutes.299 According to this argument, the motivation
for broadening the scope of the substantive criminal law is
particularly strong where Congress may perceive that the defendants
are wealthy and therefore that the government is at a comparative
disadvantage.3° Thus, "white collar offenses, unlike traditional street
crimes such as burglary, robbery, or homicide, cover a vast range of
conduct that neither Congress nor prosecutors could plausibly wish to
punish. '301 Uncharacteristically, the liberal justices often approve of
these efforts by a "law and order" Congress to get "tough" on crime.
In this light, the task of defining white collar crime is largely left
to prosecutors and the courts. As to the former, concerns with
vagueness and overcriminalization overlap with those relating to
prosecutorial discretion. If white collar statutes often cover activity
that neither Congress nor prosecutors would consider criminal, then
those statutes by definition allocate a vast amount of discretion to
prosecutors. The focus thus shifts from police conduct-the subject
of the bulk of the Court's non-white collar criminal jurisprudence,302
where conservatives tend to favor the government-to prosecutors.3°3
Prosecutors' broad readings of white collar statutes, particularly
during the 1980s, 304 inevitably required the courts to assume a larger-
than-usual role in setting the parameters of criminal statutes. As
Professor Coffee has noted, "the federal law of 'white collar' crime
are appropriately the subject of criminal sanction).
296. See supra at III.B.1.a (discussion of insider trading cases).
297. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussion of Evans and McCormick)
298. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of the
criminalization of fraud, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Modem Mail Fraud: The Restoration of
the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427 (1998).
299. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 56-58 (1997).
300. Id. at 56-57. As noted in the previous section, this perception is largely inaccurate.
Nonetheless, if the perception is widely-held, then the conclusion is justified.
301. Id. at 57.
302. See Henning, supra note 133, at 408.
303. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussion of Evans, 504 U.S. 255, and
Justice Thomas' focus on prosecutorial discretion).
304. See Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial
Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 137 (1995).
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now seems to be judge-made to an unprecedented degree, with courts
deciding on a case-by-case, retrospective basis whether conduct falls
within often vaguely defined legislative prohibitions. ' 3 5 Because the
legislature is primarily responsible for defining crimes,3°6 perhaps
conservatives view narrow interpretations of vague white collar
statutes as appropriate signals that Congress should do its job.3 07
(2) "Substance" vs. "Procedure" Revisited
The above view of the criminalization of white collar crime also
dovetails with the "substance" vs. "procedure" distinction discussed
in Part II.3  If it is true that conservatives favor a jurisprudence that
primarily values truth-seeking, while liberals favor a jurisprudence
that focuses on fair treatment of defendants,3°9 then the values that
traditionally govern the justices' approach to criminal law issues do
not always apply to issues focused solely on statutory construction.
Thus, in most cases, the conservatives' instincts will be to read
white collar statutes narrowly. But if the truth-seeking process is at
issue, the justices may well revert to their usual criminal justice
philosophies, even in the white collar context. In one recent false
statements case, for example, the Court adhered to its usual
conservative/pro-government, liberal/pro-defense stance.310  In
Brogan v. United States, the majority declined to adopt an
"exculpatory no" defense, and found that a defendant can be
305. See Coffee, supra note 281, at 198; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost" The
Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101
YALE LJ. 1875, 1879-80 (1992) (discussing the law of insider trading and extortion by
public officials).
306. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1302 (1998) ("If criminal law truly is and shall remain a community
practice, and a flexible and dynamic one at that, then the competent forum for that
practice must be the legislature, not a constitutional court whose judgments are manifestly
less representative, ostensibly final and authoritative, and, thus, difficult to undo").
307. See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, 492 U.S. 229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy) ("No constitutional
[vagueness] challenge to [RICO] has been raised in the present case, and so that issue is
not before us. That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive from this
statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that
challenge is presented.").
308. See supra Part II.
309. See supra Part H (discussion of Leon, 468 U.S. 897).
310. Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998). Justice Scalia wrote the Brogan
majority opinion, which was joined in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas-the usual conservative alignment. Concerned about
the decision's implications, Justices Souter, id. at 812 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), and Ginsburg, id. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment), joined in part and concurred in the judgment, respectively, while Justices
Stevens and Breyer dissented, id. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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convicted simply for denying guilt to a government agent3  Justice
Scalia's majority opinion focused upon the statute's truth-seeking
function: "We cannot imagine how it could be true that falsely
denying guilt in a Government investigation does not pervert a
governmental function. '312 The Brogan majority also rejected an
argument based on the Fifth Amendment: "Whether or not the
predicament of the wrongdoer run to ground tugs at the heart strings,
neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a
privilege to lie." This biting language is rarely invoked by
conservative justices in the white collar crime cases. Both the rhetoric
and the voting thus appear to be a product of the "truth-seeking"
context of this case,313 rather than the white collar context.
(3) Evaluating the Issue-Based Explanation
Explanations for the voting dichotomy that turn on a "micro"
analysis of the types of issues the cases raise are helpful, but, I
believe, really prove too much. As to cases turning on statutory
construction, there are few if any non-white collar criminal contexts
where the conservatives and liberals uniformly flip sides,314 as they do
regularly when construing white collar crimes. 315 As to the white
collar statutes' vagueness and the leeway thus granted prosecutors,
the Court's conservatives have shown little concern, outside the white
collar context,316 for the vagaries of prosecutors' discretion.317 Finally,
as to the Court's arguable concern for the proper role of the
governmental branches, one of the ironies of the white collar cases is
that the conservatives in so many of these cases interpret statutes in
311. In so holding, the majority rejected the decisions of at least seven circuit courts.
Id at 808, citing Moser v. United States, 18 F. 3d. 469 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Taylor, 907 F. 2d. 801 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F. 2d. 179 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor,
788 F. 2d. 714 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F. 2d. 874 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Chevoor, 526 F. 2d. 178 (1st Cir. 1986).
312. Id. at 808.
313. Contrast, for example, Scalia's opinion in Brogan from his dissenting opinion in
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which he criticized the majority for
its unduly broad reading of the securities fraud statute. See supra notes 181-84 and
accompanying text.
314. This does occur in some of the firearms cases the Court has considered. See infra
note 323.
315. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199; Cheek, 498 U.S. 192;
Evans, 504 U.S. 255.
316. See Evans, 504 U.S. 255; Williams, 504 U.S. 36.
317. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (in rejecting a challenge to
the death penalty as racially-biased, the conservative majority noted that "the capacity of
prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is 'firmly entrenched in American
law.') (quoting 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 160 (1984)).
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ways that favor the defendant, even in the face of the clear weight of
long-established precedent.3 18 Such judicial activism hardly seems to
comport with a traditional conservative's view of the Court's proper
role, either with respect to the Court's relationship with Congress or
the Court's deference to precedent.
Nor does the substance/procedure distinction provide much in
the way of a broadly-applicable explanation. As noted in Part III,
even in the procedural arena, the Court generally does not hew to its
usual criminal case voting patterns when the context is white collar
crime. In cases involving grand juries and the corporate Fifth
Amendment privilege,319 liberals and conservatives have joined in
alignments we rarely see in the non-white collar procedure cases.
Moreover, the substance/procedure distinction is hardly pristine, and
there are a number of cases that do not fall clearly within either
category.3 20 The distinction may be marginally useful in analyzing
cases such as Brogan321-a "substantive" case that raises themes
usually addressed in the "procedural" cases- but hardly seems to
explain the voting dichotomy in any larger sense.
It may be that these jurisprudential concerns, relating to the
proper role of the criminal law (truth-seeking vs. due process) and to
the vagaries of statutory construction, are simply too narrowly
focused to provide much insight into the Supreme Court's white
collar crime cases. If we move from the "micro" level of individual
issues to the "macro" level of the political system itself, however, the
underpinnings of the white collar voting dichotomy begin to come
into focus.
C. The Politics of Limiting Federal Power
Two political dynamics, each of which operates to restrict the
role of the federal government, appear to be at work in the white
collar arena. First, a number of the white collar cases involve, directly
or indirectly, the role of the federal government vis-a-vis the states.
Second, a number of the cases also involve the federal government's
power to regulate economic activities. Each of these dynamics would
appear, at least on its face, to transform the usual criminal justice
philosophies in the white collar arena.
(1) The State/Federal Dichotomy
Issues of federalism, and in particular the federalization of crime,
318. E.g., McNally, 483 U.S. 350; O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199.
319. See supra note 243.
320. See supra Part I.C. (discussing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, Braswell, 487 U.S. 99,
and R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292).
321. 118 S. Ct. 805, discussed supra at note 309.
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are certainly enjoying a new vogue among the Court and among
commentators.322 In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist has spoken loudly
and clearly on the issue, most recently invoking "the traditional
principle of federalism" to conclude that criminal matters "that can
be adequately handled by the states should be left to them....-323
And the Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez, 324 in which a
five-member conservative majority invalidated a criminal statute
under the Commerce Clause, signaled to many the Court's new focus
on federalism 25
The Court's increased attention to federalism comes after more
than two decades of expanding federal jurisdiction over white collar
crime.326 Such broad-ranging statutes as the RICO and money-
laundering statutes federally criminalize vast ranges of activities;
indeed, a federal RICO case can be based not only upon such crimes
322. See, e.g., Gerald Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98
W. VA. L. REV. 789 (1996); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles
to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979
(1995); Kathleen Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135 (1995); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997); Sanford H. Kadish, The
Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247 (1995). One author recently noted
that "more of the current Justices spend more time in opinions talking about
federalism... than has been so since the 'nine old men' of the 1920's and early 30's."
Francis X. Beytagh, Commentary on 'Perspectives on a Divided Court' by Judge Louis H.
Pollak, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 307,313 (1996).
323. CHIEF JUSTICE CRITICIZES TREND TOWARD FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME, 66
U.S.L.W. 2722 (May 26,1998).
324. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
325. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. In fact, the conservatives' hostility to the federalization of
crime seems not to be limited to constitutional arguments but also to extend to ordinary
statutory construction cases. See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911,1920 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (the Rehnquist/ScalialThomas conservative triumvirate joined in
a dissent from the majority's broad reading of a federal firearms statute).
326. Professor Stuntz argues that constitutional limitations on law enforcement have led
Congress to federalize crime in areas where the defendants can afford to litigate
constitutional claims. See Stuntz, supra note 298, at 56. Some aspects of white collar
crime, however, tend not to support this conclusion. First, as noted in Part I.A.2 supra, the
white collar defendant often does not have any more resources than the common crime
defendant. Further, search and seizure law is largely irrelevant to white collar
investigations. See supra note 97 (noting that most evidence in white collar cases is
developed through the use of subpoenas). Finally, to the extent that the white collar
defendant can afford private counsel, that defendant is also unlikely to raise Fifth and
Sixth Amendment claims relating to confessions because the attorney is likely to advise
the client not to talk with investigators. Still, if Congress shares Professor Stuntz's
perception, then that perception may have produced the described result. I tend to
believe, however, that the vagueness and breadth of many white collar statutes are more
likely the result of legislative laziness than of the sort of deliberate calculation Professor
Stuntz describes.
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as mail fraud, securities fraud, and bank fraud, but also upon the
commission of state law crimes such as bribery and extortion.3 27
Although enacted in 1970,328 RICO began to be expansively used by
prosecutors in white collar cases only in the 1980s.3 29 Likewise, the
federal money laundering statute covers a vast array of activities, but
is of recent provenance; the statute was enacted in 1986,330 and
expanded in 1988331 and 1992.332
It is not clear, however, just how far this argument will take us,
for the issue of over-federalization often seems beside the point in the
white collar context. In his critique of the federalization of crime, the
Chief Justice has focused not on white collar crime but on common
crime.333 Indeed, the former is an area that often seems ripe for
federalization. For example, the regulation of the national securities
laws, to quote the Chief Justice, is precisely the sort of matter "that
cannot [be adequately handled by the states and] should be
undertaken by the federal government. ''334 To some extent, the same
can be said of the RICO and money laundering statutes, neither of
which has been substantially narrowed by the Court.
On the other hand, some white collar cases explicitly raise the
federalism issue in areas that arguably are plainly unsuited to
federalization. 335 For example, as discussed in Part III above, 336 the
Court has acted to narrow the federal mail fraud statute, which
327. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961. For an example of a criminal RICO case built upon state
white collar offenses, see United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1992). For an
overview of the RICO statute's applicability to white collar cases, see Paul Vizcarrondo,
Jr., RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO), IN WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES 11-1 (Obermaier & Morvillo,
eds. 1998).
328. Pub. L. No. 91-452,84 Stat. 922 (1970).
329. See William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 790 (1988);
T. Todd Tumbelson, Tax Fraud and Civil RICO: Implications for Business and
Governmental Entities, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1233, 1274 (1988). By 1987, prosecutors
had gone so far as to bring a federal tax case under the RICO statute. See United States v.
Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (1988). For criticism of the government for bringing this case, see
Sherry R. Sontag, Princeton/Newport Case: RICO Stretched Too Far?, NAT'L L. J., Nov.
20,1989, at 3; Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 10, 1992, at 15; and Sherry
Sontag, RICO Fades Away on Wall Street, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 28,1992, at 3.
330. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57.
331. Pub. L. No. 100-690,102 Stat. 4181, 4354 (1988).
332. Pub. L. No. 102-550,106 Stat. 3678, 4055 (1992).
333. See supra note 322.
334. Id,
335. See Norman Abrams, Assessing the Federal Government's 'War' on White-Collar
Crime, 53 TMPLE L. Q. 984, 1004 (1980) ("the federal government's efforts may also
encompass more localized crimes, such as domestic commercial bribery and large-scale
local embezzlements or frauds. One can fairly ask whether such cases should not be left to
state and local law enforcement").
336. See supra Part III.
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prosecutors have used in both run-of-the-mill fraud337 and local
political corruption338 cases. Thus, in McNally, the majority wrote,
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and
state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection
of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has.339
Even more pointedly, the conservative dissenters later criticized
the Court's Evans holding, which expanded the reach of the federal
extortion statute into local corruption cases:
The Court's construction of the Hobbs Act is repugnant... to
basic tenets of federalism. Over the past 20 years, the Hobbs Act
has served as the engine for a stunning expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and
local laws-acts of public corruption by state and local officials. 4
Indeed, this deference to local law enforcement prerogatives
complements the conservatives' tendency, in criminal procedure
cases, to limit federal constitutional restrictions on law enforcement
practices.341
In contrast, for liberals, the federal government can and should
play a role in enforcing the criminal law so as to protect society. As
one commentator has noted, it is appropriate for the national
government to step in when the states have failed to take appropriate
action; moreover, it is not appropriate-according to this argument-
for the Court to substitute its own judgment for that of the political
branches when it comes to issues of federalism: "Returning more
power to the States, especially through an instrumentality as ill-
equipped to make such policy judgments as the Supreme Court,
provides no assurance that the issues of interest to most Americans
will be addressed effectively." 342
The white collar cases thus show that principles of federalism can
explain some, but far from all, of the voting anomalies in those cases.
A desire to return power to the states is applicable to fraud and local
corruption cases, for example, but is largely irrelevant to cases in such
areas as federal tax and securities fraud, where state enforcement
would be nonsensical.
337. See, e.g., Maze, 414 U.S. 395.
338. See, e.g., McNally, 483 U.S. 350.
339. 483 U.S. at 360.
340. 504 U.S. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
341. See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185,247 (1983).
342. Beytagh, supra note 321, at 314.
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(2) Protection of the Market Economy
Perhaps another traditional liberal/conservative political policy
split, that relating to the federal government's proper role in
regulating economic activities, may also help explain the white collar
case voting patterns. In analyzing the Commerce Clause in the
context of the political system itself, one commentator has noted
that, "[i]n addition to establishing a national government with
enumerated powers, constrained by the doctrine of federalism, the
Constitution also provides for the operation of a national market
economy. This is done largely by allowing for the free flow of
commerce among the states and by protecting the institution of
private property."343 In this light, just as the conservative justices'
political instincts may lead them to seek to restrict the federal
government's intrusion into areas of state criminal law enforcement,
so may those instincts lead them to seek to restrict the federal
government's intrusion into the functioning of the market
economy.W Likewise, the liberals may tend to perceive the federal
role in both of the these areas as both appropriate and desirable.
When it comes to securities regulation, for example, it thus
makes sense that the conservatives would seek to restrict
criminalization by invoking the doctrine of lenity and narrowly
reading statutory provisions, as Justice Scalia did when rejecting the
misappropriation theory as a basis for insider trading liability3 5 In
this view, the market economy by its nature functions most efficiently
when left to self-regulation; government interference, even by way of
white collar criminal prosecutions, simply promotes inefficiency. It
thus also makes sense in O'Hagan that Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist would chastise the majority for adopting a statutory
interpretation that "fails to provide a coherent and consistent
interpretation" of liability.346 Incoherent statutory interpretations
could, so the argument goes, produce uncertainty and inefficiency in
343. Richard A. Champagne, The Problem of Integrity, Tradition, and Text in
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REv. 78, 85-86 (1993).
344. See generally Stephen F. Gottlieb, The Moral Agendas of Justices O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 229 (1996) (noting that some Supreme Court
cases illustrate these justices' "support for economic conservatism which stresses free
markets and official noninterference"). Likewise, the conservative justices may believe
that the policing of some white collar activities is better left to civil enforcement
mechanisms. For a discussion of the overlap between the civil and criminal law in this
context, see Coffee, Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models,
supra note 304, at 1879-80; and Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. 1795,1798 (1992).
345. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see
supra note 181.
346. Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
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the operation of the securities markets in particular, and the market
economy in general. Finally, in the tax context, it also makes sense
that the conservatives would vote to impose on the government an
onerous willfulness requirement, thus seeking to ensure that the
government's power to criminalize tax fraud would be limited to only
the most egregious cases.347
The more liberal interpretation of the securities laws, on the
other, evinces an entirely different perspective. In Dirks, for
example, the Blackmun/BrennanMarshall dissent criticized the pro-
defendant conservative majority for "tak[ing] still another step to
limit the protections provided investors .... 348 Likewise, the
liberal/moderate O'Hagan majority turned to policy arguments when
approving the misappropriation theory: "The theory is... well-tuned
to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." 349 A
federal government actively seeking to regulate the economy-and to
broadly enforce its criminal tax laws350-is just the sort of image over
which the traditional liberal/conservative political debate is cast.
(3) Evaluating the Federal/Political Explanation
It thus appears that political views over the federal government's
role vis-a-vis the states and the market economy may do much to
explain the white collar voting dichotomy. But it is not clear how far
this explanation can take us. A desire to return power to the states is
applicable to fraud and local corruption cases, for example, but is
largely irrelevant to cases in such areas as federal tax and securities
fraud, where state enforcement would be inappropriate. Although
the market economy focus is relevant to the latter areas, it is not
relevant to such issues as the scope of grand juries' powers.
Nor does federalism explain the broader philosophical
inconsistencies displayed in the range of criminal cases. First,
something is amiss in a universe in which conservatives, under the
guise of obeisance to federalism, adopt a laissez faire philosophy in
cases involving the government's role in the market economy, while
at the same time voting (in the Fourth Amendment context) to
expand state and federal law enforcement's power based upon "the
public interest in preventing drug traffic"351-which is the product of
market demand, after all-and to support (in the substantive due
process context) the criminalization of private, noncommercial,
347. See Cheek, 498 U.S. 192, discussed supra note 188 and accompanying text.
348. 463 U.S. at 667. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
349. 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
350. See 117 S. Ct. at 2212 (Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
351. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,560 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
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consensual sex-a direct governmental intrusion into the private
sphere.3 52  Conversely, it still seems inconsistent for liberals
instinctively to support federal prosecution of corrupt local officials,
for example, while at the same time placing substantial constraints on
law enforcement evidence-gathering efforts. Concededly, the
distinction between the liberal/"fairness of the process" and
conservative/"truth-seeking" approaches may explain some of these
apparent inconsistencies, but I suspect something deeper, and more
profound, is at work in these cases.
D. Criminalization and the Weighing of "Harm"
As Professor Henry Hart noted over thirty years ago, courts
consistently face issues of criminalization, and yet rarely if ever
clearly articulate the boundaries beyond which the state may not
invoke the criminal sanction. 353 In the classic terms of the debate
between H.L.A. Hart and Lord Devlin (the "Hart-Devlin Debate"),
the contest is between "liberalism" (the view that preventing harm to
others is the proper basis of criminalization), and "legal moralism"
(the view that inherently immoral acts can be criminalized
irrespective of the harm caused).354 Under the latter approach,
criminal laws may be justified by their roles in maintaining social
order; in a sense, the "harm" to be prevented is the harm to society
rather than to an identifiable victim. If, along Hart-Devlin lines,
liberals and conservatives have opposing (albeit seldom explicitly
stated) views of the proper bases of criminalization, then perhaps
those views lead the groups to perceive-consistent with each group's
ideology-common crime and white collar crime as fundamentally
different.
(1) The Perceived Harm in Non-White Collar Crime Cases
In non-white collar cases, the rhetoric and imagery vividly
illustrate these divergent conceptions of the notion of harm. First, as
352. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, discussed supra note 134 and accompanying text.
353. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 401 (1958). As Hart wrote,
If one were to judge from the notions apparently underlying many judicial
opinions, and the overt language even of some of them,.., a crime is anything
which is called a crime, and a criminal penalty is simply the penalty provided for
doing anything which has been given that name. So vacant a concept is a
betrayal of intellectual bankruptcy.
Id. at 404 (citation omitted).
354. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Symposium Issues in the Philosophy of Law: Participant
Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 73, 75 (1995) (quoting Joel Feinberg,
Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE 249 (1987)). Of course,
the subject of the Hart-Devlin debate was the criminalization of sodomy in Britain.
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discussed in detail above,355 in cases involving violent crime, there is a
stark distinction between the conservative focus on the harm to the
victim and society, and the liberal focus on the fairness to the
defendant. This is clear through a wide range of "procedural" cases.
Second, the pattern repeats itself, in a slightly different guise, in
substantive due process cases and in Eighth Amendment cases not
involving violent crime. I will focus on one example of the former,
Bowers v. Hardwick,356 and one of the latter, Harmelin v.
Michigan357-both hotly-contested, highly-politicized cases decided
by five-to-four margins, in which the liberal and conservative blocs
appear to view the nature of criminalization quite differently.
In the Eighth Amendment context, first consider Justice
Kennedy's Harmelin opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter,358 in which he concurred with Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in upholding a life sentence without parole for a first-time
narcotics offense. To justify a finding that the crime was sufficiently
serious to merit the punishment, Kennedy wrote, "Petitioner's
suggestion that his crime was nonviolent and victimless, echoed by the
dissent, is false to the point of absurdity. To the contrary, petitioner's
crime threatened to cause grave harm to society. '359
Justice White's dissent in Harmelin, joined in whole or part by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall, represents a different
conception of the "harm" that may justify punishment. In assessing
the validity of the sentence under the Eighth Amendment, Justice
White noted that, "Unlike crimes directed against persons and
property of others, possession of drugs affects the criminal who uses
the drugs most directly. ' '36° Because the crime involved no direct
victim, White suggested, the defendant's "moral guilt" was less than
355. See supra Part II.A.
356. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
357. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
358. This opinion was issued during Justice Souter's second term on the Court. Since
then Souter's voting record in criminal cases has grown substantially more liberal. In 1990
Souter voted for the government in state criminal cases 68% of the time; in 1992, 55% of
the time; in 1994, 41.7% of the time; and in 1995, 22% of the time. Richard G. Wilkins,
Matthew K. Richards, Scott Worthington, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1,15 (1996).
359. 501 U.S. at 1002 (emphasis added; citation omitted). Kennedy proceeds with a
litany of harms he believes are caused by narcotics. See id. Apparently, the conservatives
do not recognize societal harm from weapons, given their tendency to void, see Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, or read narrowly, federal firearms statutes, see, e.g., Caron v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 2007, 2012, (1998)(Thomas, J., dissenting) (the rule of lenity applies to firearms
sentence enhancement statute); Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1949 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (government should have to prove elevated level of willfulness in
firearms prosecution).
360. See Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957,1022 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
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that of violent criminals.361 In this debate,, the conservative/pro-
punishment argument focuses not on specific harm to individuals, but
on harm to society; the moderate-liberal/restrict-punishment
argument focuses on the lack of a direct victim.
Next, consider the implicit and explicit debate over the nature of
"harm" and the role of harm in justifying criminalization in
Hardwick-the rare case directly addressing such issues. In that case,
the Court split along predictable conservative/liberal lines. The four-
member liberal dissent articulated H.L.A. Hart's classic justification
for criminalization 362-harm to persons or property-and found the
Georgia sodomy statute wholly lacking.3 63 On the other hand, both
the majority opinion364 and Chief Justice Burger's365 concurring
opinion articulated the classic justification offered by Lord Devlin for
criminalization-the enforcement of majoritarian morality-which in
turn protects society as a whole.3 66
The Harmelin and Hardwick justifications can be seen as two
sides of the same coin; as Lord Devlin argued, it is the moral fabric of
society itself that the criminal law seeks to protect.367 But in his
Hardwick dissent, Justice Blackmun disagreed that an invocation of
morality alone can justify criminalization: "This case involves no real
interference with the rights of others, for the mere knowledge that
other individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a
legally cognizable interest, let alone an interest that can justify
invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens .... "368 Why
Justice White was more inclined to find absence of harm in Harmelin
than he was in Hardwick is not clear (though we could speculate); but
the fact remains that the pro- defendant, liberal approach in each case
seeks to restrict the government's power (either to criminalize or to
punish) based upon the complete (Hardwick), or relative (Harmelin),
absence of perceived harm the defendant caused.
(2) The Perceived "Harm" in White Collar Crime Cases
Commentators from Sutherland on have taken note of the vast
361. Id. at 1023.
362. H. L. A. Hart, IMMORALITY AND TREASON, reprinted in THE LAW AS
LITERATURE 220,225 (1961).
363. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 196.
365. Id. at 196. (Burger, CJ., concurring) (concluding that "millennia of moral
teaching" justify the result).
366. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for
Hidden Determinates of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L. J. 1073, 1093-96 (1988).
367. ROBERT M. BAIRD AND STUART E. ROSENBAUM, PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS AND THE LAW, 15,19-20 (1988).
368. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
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economic consequences of white collar crime. Many of these
commentators' conclusions, including the observation that white
collar crime produces greater total harm than non-white collar crime,
seem indisputable.3 69  Moreover, judges take note of the
consequences of white collar crime, particularly in sentencing.370
But the perceived harm from white collar crime is subject to at
least two qualifications. First, with respect to the criminal
enforcement of some economic regulations, there is substantial
debate over whether the criminal activities cause any harm. Most
obviously, judges and commentators have long-debated whether
insider trading harms, or rather benefits, the securities markets and
their investors.371 Second, with respect to some other white collar
crimes, there may be general agreement that the activity is harmful,
but identifying a particular victim or class of victims is difficult.
Bribery, for example, typically involves "victims" only in the sense
that the defendant has violated the larger public trust.372 Likewise,
with respect to violations of currency reporting statutes, the Supreme
Court itself recently noted that the crime causes little harm: "Failure
to report [defendant's] currency affected only one party, the
Government, and in a relatively minor way. There was no fraud on
369. See Abrams, supra note 334, at 1001 (noting that losses from white collar crime
exceed those from non-white collar crime); Blakey, supra note 278, at 1193 ("Although
white collar offenses are less visible than crimes such as burglary and robbery, their overall
economic impact may be considerably greater"); Braithwaite, supra note 33, at 743
(concluding that the "financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great
as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the 'crime
problem"'); Sutherland, supra note 23; Reiman, supra note 276, at 111-16. Note, however,
that white collar prosecutions themselves are costly, both in terms of the vast amounts of
prosecutorial resources required, see Coffee, Paradigms Lost" The Blurring of the Criminal
and Civil Law Models, supra note 304, at 1889, and the potential interference with and
impact upon the market economy, see notes 344-46 supra and accompanying text.
370. See Wheeler, supra note 12, at 62-80 (amount of financial loss is key factor in
sentencing). For an analysis of how loss is taken into account under the federal sentencing
guidelines, see Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on
Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247 (1991); Ronald
Cass, Sentencing Corporations: The Guidelines' White Collar Blues, 71 B.U.L. REV. 29
(1991).
371. E.g., compare O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210 ("investors likely would hesitate to
venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law"), with Dirks, 463 U.S. at 677 n.14 (arguing that the
majority position conforms to the "theory that insider trading should be permitted because
it brings relevant information to the market"). See generally Richard W. Painter, et aL,
Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153,
168 n.57 (1998) ("Whether insider trading actually harms investors has been much
disputed.").
372. See Leo Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 80, 90-93 (Dennis Patterson, ed., 1996); Andrew Von Hirsch, supra note
368, at 1174.
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the United States, and respondent caused no loss to the public fisc." 373
Further, even where the harm is certain and the victim
identifiable, many judges in sentencing perceive that harm from white
collar offenses may somehow be different from, and less serious than,
harm from violent crime.374 As one commentator has argued, "There
is a considerable difference between convicting a corporation which
takes money by fraud and convicting an individual who takes it at the
point of a gun."375 Indeed, in the Fourth Amendment context, the
Supreme Court has concluded that white collar felonies are relatively
less "dangerous" than many non-white collar misdemeanors.3 76
"Danger," in this context, is clearly defined as danger of physical,
rather than economic, harm.
It is precisely physical harm, in all its guises, that the conservative
approach in non-white collar cases emphasizes.3 77 Because this threat
is absent from the white collar cases, conservative justices are freed to
abandon their usual law-enforcement biases. Causing non-violent
economic harm, however, seems to be a much more egregious offense
to the liberals, who view the defendants in such cases as both morally
lacking and as undeserving of the procedural protections so important
to non-white collar defendants.
E. Reevaluating White Collar Criminalization
What this all suggests, I believe, is that the white collar paradox
is rooted, ultimately, in the justices' views of the proper role of
criminal law. And at this point we come full-circle, for these
perspectives are likely rooted in socio-economic biases that parallel
the justices' political philosophies. As Mark Kelman has argued,
"The most basic task of a dominant group is to identify criminality
with disruption, with incidents that break the ordinary flow of
distribution of burdens and benefits." 378 There is substantial evidence
that conservative justices believe that the criminal law primarily
should be designed to protect against physical injury to individuals
(violent crimes) and general injury to society (narcotics offenses,
sodomy).379 For conservatives, then, "disruption" means threats to
373. United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028,2039 (1998).
374. See Wheeler, et aL, supra note 12.
375. Braithwaite, supra note 33, at 748.
376. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,14 & n.12 (1984).
377. See supra note 78 (discussion of rhetoric and imagery in non-white collar cases).
The only exception to this emphasis seems to arise in cases where conservatives perceive
that the moral fabric of society is threatened. See supra notes 356-68 and accompanying
text.
378. Kelman, supra note 257, at 671.
379. Perhaps all-too-predictably in light of the surrounding political debate, firearms
offenses appear not to threaten the sort of harm that arouses the conservative justices'
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"law and order" as measured by the physical safety of society (or at
least its middle and upper classes), or by the security of its moral
structure; criminalization is or should be constructed to minimize such
threats. Correspondingly, criminalization of white collar activities-
which do not involve threats to individuals' physical safety or society's
moral fabric380 - itself threatens different kinds of disruption: that of
the free flow of the market economy, and that of the appropriate
allocation of state and federal powers.
The liberal justices, on the other hand, are inclined to view non-
violent crimes far more seriously than conservatives, and to be willing
to broadly sanction those acts, particularly where an individual of
status has abused a position of wealth or power. Violent crime may
be, to these jurists, largely a product of the defendants' socio-
economic environments. 381 But with the white collar criminal, who
has an advantageous socio-economic position and has abused it, there
is little need to restrict the government's ability to prosecute and
punish.
If I am right, then we have a solution to the white collar paradox,
but one that is more unsettling than the "traditional," socio-economic
explanation. Rather than simply identifying with - or not identifying
with - the white collar defendants, the justices seem to lose their
philosophical bearings in these cases. The result is cases in which the
rhetoric is both hypocritical and result-driven.
The solution is for the Court to forego its hesitation to squarely
address appropriate limitations on the government's power to
criminalize. Surely, all the justices agree that there is some limit to
criminalization; those who argue that society deems acts to be
"wrong" because they are crimes382 have the cart before the horse.
But, I suggest, the Court has placed itself in an untenable position by
not confronting the issue, except in the rare case, like Hardwick,
where it is unavoidable.3 3 The result of not facing the criminalization
issue is that the justices, in the white collar cases, vote in ways that
appear inconsistent and hypocritical when compared to their voting in
concern. See supra note 324.
380. See supra note 37.
381. The liberal/conservative criminal law debate is often cast in terms of
"determinism" (a defendant's acts are caused by preceding factors) vs. "intentionalism" (a
defendant's acts are the product of free will). See Kelman, supra note 257, at 597.
382. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L. J. 1533
(1997).
383. That is not to say that the criminalization discussion in Hardwick evinced
intellectual honesty; in the majority and concurring opinions, the contrary is true. See, e.g.,
Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden
Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L. 1073 (1988).
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non-white collar cases. Consistency will require that the justices
apply their individual conceptions of criminal law to both white collar
and non-white collar cases.
In practical terms, facing the white collar criminalization issue
will often mean declining to rewrite a facially inadequate criminal
statute. When a legislature attempts to criminalize activities the
margins of which will be difficult to define, the body should give the
matter the deliberation it requires. When the Court undertakes that
task, the outcome is poorly-reasoned decisions not based upon sound
jurisprudence. Thus, for example, the O'Hagan Court might have
squarely faced the impropriety of choosing to interpret a statutory
scheme in a way that effectively required the justices to write the
law.384 A conservative justice might admit that the scope of harm that
insider trading causes is difficult to identify, and require Congress to
draw the boundaries of criminalization carefully. A liberal justice
might admit, in the same context, that economic harm is just as
important as physical harm, and encourage Congress to provide the
courts with guidance in enforcing the securities laws. The same
analysis applies, for example, to the political corruption cases. In
McCormick and Evans, the Court might thus have concluded that the
defendants' acts were not within the clear language of the statute and
declined to attempt to concoct its own language, particularly when
that language turned out to be well-nigh incomprehensible.385
In this context, the Court would do well to heed Justice Scalia's
warning, in the RICO context, that Court-defined, vague statutory
terms are constitutionally suspect.386 It is no response to rely upon
prosecutorial discretion to limit the reach of such expansive statutory
interpretations, for prosecutors are human, and human nature is all
too-often to use power to the fullest extent granted.387 At root is a
political question for the Court-at what point must it decline to
compensate for Congress' failure to consider rationally and carefully
statutory prescriptions of white collar criminal activity. It may be, as
Professor Bilionis has written in response to Henry Hart, that
"[c]riminal law choices are controvertible, fundamentally political,
and thus best left to the political departments." s3 s But concepts of
384. See supra, text at notes 181-184.
385. See supra, text at notes 209-216.
386. See supra note 232.
387. Cf. John C. Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud- The Continuing Story of the
Evolution of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 19 (1983) ("The mail fraud
statute is one of several federal statutes whose recent expansion permits the prosecutor to
exercise virtually unlimited discretion in defining the kind of behavior on which he intends
to focus"). Coffee also characterizes RICO and the Hobbs Act as providing such
discretion. See id. at n.83.
388. Bilionis, supra note 305, at 1294.
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due process have meaning, and apply to the criminal law, however
"political" the criminalization process may be. And indeed,
invalidating an overbroad statute, or declining to construe a statute
broadly, returns the issue to the political process by leaving it to
Congress to redress the problem.389
Conclusion
I am not arguing for a return to the emphasis of Henry Hart and
Sanford Kadish on the folly of criminalizing economic regulations.
Rather, I suggest that Congress, the courts, and their observers
acknowledge that many types of white collar "crimes" are different, in
some basic way, from other types of crimes. The resultant harm, and
the victims of the harm, are often difficult to identify; even where this
is not so, the harm is of a different nature that the harm form non-
white collar crimes. These crimes therefore require especially careful
legislative deliberation and construction. When those processes have
become dysfunctional, the Court should decline to provide the
remedy. Instead of acting upon shifting and seemingly hypocritical
criminal justice philosophies, the justices could consistently apply
substantive constitutional limitations to white collar criminalization.
389. Indeed, Bilionis reaches the same conclusion. Id. at 1325 ("When the Court
invalidates a vague statute, it in essence remands the statute to the legislature for further
deliberation and the making of those basic [policy] choices .... ")
1270 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
APPENDIX
Table 1: Non-White Collar Crime Cases
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (possession of marijuana
and cocaine)
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (fraudulent
misappropriation; false pretenses)
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (possession of stolen
property)
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (sodomy)
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (murder)
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (possession of
marijuana for sale)
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (possession of
marijuana for sale)
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1983) (growing marijuana)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (possession of
cocaine)
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (drug
importation and distribution)
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (murder)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (murder)
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (possession of cocaine,
cash & paraphernalia)
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (possession of cocaine)
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (murder; rape)
Gray v. United States, 118 U.S. 1151 (1998) (murder)
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (armed robbery; murder)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (possession of
cocaine)
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (burglary and rape)
Horton v. California, 498 U.S. 128 (1990) (robbery)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (possession of narcotic
with intent to deliver)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (possession of marijuana,
weapons & other contraband)
Kuhimann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (murder and weapons)
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (possession of heroin,
hash, and paraphernalia)
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (armed robbery)
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (murder)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (murder; armed
robbery)
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Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (possession of heroin)
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)
(sobriety checkpoints)
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (possession of marijuana)
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (possession of
cocaine)
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (murder)
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (murder)
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (conspiracy to
possess and distribute drugs)
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (possession of cocaine)
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (delinquency;
possession of marijuana)
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (rape)
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (kidnapping and murder)
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (growing marijuana)
Oregon v. Elstad, 476 U.S. 298 (1985) (burglary)
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (murder)
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (possession of drugs)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (kidnapping, robbery
and murder)
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (obtaining money by
false pretenses)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (possessing a
check with intent to defraud)
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (possession of
cocaine)
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (murder)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (burglary)
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) (RICO; firearm
statute)
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute)
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (robbery)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (possession of
heroin)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (conspiracy to possess
and distribute cocaine)
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (possession of
heroin)
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (murder)
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Table 2: White Collar Crime Cases
Braswel v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (5h
Amendment/corporate records)
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (mail and wire
fraud)
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (tax fraud)
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (insider trading)
Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)
(insider trading)
Dixon v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984) (bribery)
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (extortion and tax
fraud)
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991) (extortion and
tax fraud)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (mail fraud)
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (financial
structuring to avoid currency reporting)
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (mail fraud)
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (false statements to
federally insured institution)
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (false statements to
federal agency)
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (mail and
securities fraud, money laundering)
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984) (false statements
to federal agency)
United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985) (false
statements to federal agency)
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) (false
statements to grand jury)
United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974) (mail fraud)
United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (food stamp fraud)
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (filing false
Medicare claims)
Upjohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
(corporate attorney-client privilege)
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